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STATEMENT REGARDING RELATED CASES 
This matter was originally appealed and heard by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
2005. Case No. 20050246-CA {Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. Ivers, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 
2005). Following the Utah Court of Appeals decision, this Court granted Arby's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. Case No. 20060061-SC (Ivers v. Utah Dept. of Transportation., 
154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) ("Ivers F)). Following the decision in Ivers I, the case was 
remanded to the district court to determine the amount of Arby's severance damages. 
Upon a ruling by the district court, which eliminated Arby's right to pursue its severance 
damages claim, the matter once again came before the Utah Supreme Court in UDOT v. 
Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009) ("Ivers IF). Following the ruling in Ivers II, which held 
the district court had failed to follow the Court's mandate in Ivers I, the case was 
remanded to the district court and was eventually tried before a jury. The non-unanimous 
jury denied Arby's any severance damages for loss of view and this appeal was filed. 
While the present appeal was pending, the Court made a ruling in Utah 
Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208 (Utah 2012), 
which expressly overturned Ivers I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102Q. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Appellants are James Ivers5 Katherine G. Havas, and P and F Food Services, 
referred to herein collectively as "Arby's." Appellee is Utah Department of 
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Transportation, referred to herein as "UDOT." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are stated as follows: 
ISSUE: Should the jury verdict be reversed and this case remanded in light 
of the ruling in Admiral Beverage, which overturned this Court's 
previous ruling in this matter in Ivers I? 
ISSUE: Should the verdict be reversed on the basis the jury instructions were 
based upon Ivers I, which this Court has ruled was "wrongly 
decided" and "unworkable?" 
ISSUE: Should the district court be reversed on the basis it allowed UDOT's 
appraiser to render opinions that Arby's had no damages for loss of 
view? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling for correctness, granting no 
deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 
P.3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See also Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 
(Utah 2003); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most 
supportive of the verdict and a jury verdict will be upset only upon a showing that the 
evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would 
not differ on the outcome of the case. Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 210 P.3d 977, 985 
(Utah App. 2009). 
Trial court decisions determining the admissibility of expert testimony are 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. 
2 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
• Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
• Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." 
• UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-571: 
The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence 
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess: 
* * * * * 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a 
part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Arby's, through multiple appeals and a jury trial, has sought an award of 
severance damages for the reduction in fair market value of real property as a result of 
UDOT's construction project, specifically the elevation of U.S. 89 over Shepard Lane in 
Farmington, Utah. This Court ruled in Ivers I that because UDOT had taken property 
from Arby's, if that taking was necessary for its project, Arby's could seek severance 
damages for loss of view, even if the portion of the project obstructing Arby's view 
wasn't built upon the portion of the property that was taken and severed from the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
remaining property. However, this Court would not then allow severance damages based 
upon loss of visibility or any other specific factor. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
Following remand to the district court, rather than proceeding to determine Arby's 
severance damages for loss of view, the trial court granted UDOT's Motion to 
Alter/Amend Order, which had the effect of extinguishing Arby's severance damages 
claim. That ruling was appealed in Ivers II, where this Court ruled the district court had 
failed to follow the mandate in Ivers I. The case was remanded again to the district court 
for a trial on the amount of severance damages for loss of view to which Arby's was 
entitled. 
III. Disposition in the Lower Court 
Based upon the ruling in Arby's /, the parties attempted to construct jury 
instructions, which limited Arby's severance damages claim to loss of view only, rather 
than allowing the traditional diminution in value approach. The case was tried on April 
13-15, 2010. A non-unanimous jury awarded no severance damages based upon loss of 
view, despite the undisputed fact the view from Arby's property was obstructed. This 
appeal was filed, and then stayed, pending the outcome of the Admiral Beverage case. 
This Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage reversed the restrictive severance damages 
analysis in Ivers /, upon which this case was tried. 
4 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The well-known underlying facts of this case are set forth in the parties' prior 
briefing in Ivers I and Ivers II, as well as the Utah Supreme Court's rulings in those 
respective appeals. The underlying facts of this matter are also reviewed and summarized 
in the Admiral Beverage opinion. The facts related to the present appeal are as follows: 
1. Following this Court's ruling in Ivers II, the case was remanded to the 
district court on or about August 21, 2009. Opinion, R. at p. 524, et seq. (the record on 
appeal is referenced to herein as "R").1 
2. Arby's filed a Motion in Limine on or about March 31, 2010, seeking to 
limit the testimony of UDOT's appraiser, J. Phillip Cook ("Mr. Cook") and strike 
portions of his appraisal report on the basis it concludes Arby's suffered no damages. 
Motion in Limine and Memorandum, R. at p. 702-722. 
3. The district court, on April 12, 2010, denied Arby's Motion in Limine. 
Motion to Strike Portions of Mr. Cook's Appraisal Report. Ruling, R. at pp. 830-834. 
4. A jury trial was conducted from April 13 to 15, 2010. 
5. The following jury instructions were given, based upon the district court's 
and the parties' understanding of Ivers I and other severance damages cases: 
31. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS 
This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the 
State of Utah for the purpose of condemning and acquiring private 
property of the defendant landowners for a public purpose. The party 
commencing this action, known as the plaintiff, is the Utah Department 
1
 Certain sections of the record are not paginated correctly. The Court's conclusion 
appears at page 10 of its Opinion. The Opinion starts at p. 524 of the record. 
5 
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of Transportation, and the property owners, known as the defendants, are 
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in 
this case include the value of the loss of view from the defendants' 
property. 
33. TAKING 
In this case, the condemnation or "taking" involves a parcel of land 
which was condemned as an essential component for the plaintiffs 
project to expand and elevate U.S. Highway 89 ovef Shepard Lane in 
Farmington, Utah. 
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public 
highway, and a reasonable right to receive air and light from an adjacent 
public highway and a view from their property. 
If you find that the fair market value of the remaining property is less in 
the "after condition" than the "before condition" because of a loss of 
view, then you may award damages based on the reduced value of the 
remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain and not 
contingent, remote or speculative. 
A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be seen by 
passing traffic and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of 
visibility by or exposure to passing traffic. (Emphasis added). 
34. LOSS OF VIEW 
In this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a 
legal right to recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss 
of view is to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, 
created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the market value of 
the residue of the property. 
35. DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY PERMANENT INJURY 
The measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the difference in 
the fair market value of the land immediately before and after the injury. 
This is called diminution in value. 
36. FAIR MARKET VALUE 
Fair market value is the highest probable price estimated in terms of 
money that land would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with 
a reasonable time allowed in which to find a buyer with knowledge of all 
the uses and purposes to which the land was adapted. 
In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willing buyer 
would have paid a willing seller in an arms-length transaction with both 
parties being fully informed concerning all of the advantages and 
6 
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disadvantages to the property, and with neither acting under any 
compulsion to buy or sell. 
39. JUST COMPENSATION 
The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants' property 
because of public necessity. In this case, just compensation must be paid 
for the value of the loss of view from the defendants' property. Just 
compensation includes the fair market value of the loss of view from the 
defendants' property. 
40. COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES 
In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid 
to the defendants in the following manner: You will decide the value of 
the loss of view from the defendants' property by determining the fair 
market value as of December 30, 2002. 
Jury Instructions, R. at pp. 848-863. 
6. Mr. Cook, was permitted to testify at trial the Arby's suffered no damages 
for loss of view. Portions of Mr. Cook's trial testimony transcript are attached hereto as 
Addendum B hereto. 
7. Following deliberations, a non-unanimous jury awarded no severance 
damages to Arby's based upon loss of view. Special Verdict, R. at p. 864. 
8. Judgment was entered on May 4, 2010, awarding no damages to Arby's. 
Judgment on Verdict, R. at pp. 868-70. 
9. Following entry of judgment, Arby's filed a Notice of Appeal. Notice of 
Appeal, R. at pp. 872-73. 
10. While the present appeal was pending, the Admiral Beverage case, which 
sought to reverse Ivers /, came up for briefing and oral argument. 
7 
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11. Arby's filed a Motion to Stay Briefing Schedule asking for a stay of the 
present appeal pending the outcome of Admiral Beverage on the basis the ruling in 
Admiral Beverage could have a direct impact on this appeal. Motion to Stay Briefing 
Schedule, Addendum C hereto. 
12. This Court entered a stay of the proceedings in the present appeal pending 
the ruling in Admiral Beverage, Order to Stay Briefing, Addendum D hereto. 
13. Arby's was allowed to submit an amicus brief in Admiral Beverage, in 
support of the contention that Ivers I should be overturned. Amicus Brief, Addendum E 
hereto. 
14. This Court issued its ruling in Admiral Beverage on October 18, 2011, 
overturning Ivers I. 
15. Arby's filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and Remand to District 
Court in this appeal seeking a summary reversal based upon Admiral Beverage. Motion 
for Summary Disposition, Addendum F hereto. 
16. On May 11, 2012, this Court entered an order providing: 
This matter is before the Court on Appellants' motion for summary 
reversal. The motion is deferred until plenary presentation on the merits. 
The stay imposed in response to the filing of the motion is lifted. As to the 
arguments raised in connection with the motion the parties may choose to 
rest on the pleadings they have submitted or may address the matter as they 
see fit in briefing and at argument.... 
Order on Motion for Summary Disposition, Addendum G hereto. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT 
After its long history in the appellate court system, the jury trial on Arby's 
severance damages claim was finally conducted on April 13-15, 2010. Based upon the 
narrow ruling in Ivers 7, the sole issue to be tried was severance damages based upon loss 
of view due to the obstruction constructed by UDOT. A non-unanimous jury awarded 
Arby's no severance damages based upon loss of view, despite the undisputed fact view 
from the subject property was obstructed. This outcome highlights the serious 
constitutional problems with the Ivers I decision and its unworkability in application. 
While the present appeal was pending, the Utah Supreme Court, in Admiral 
Beverage, expressly overturned Ivers L Based upon the fact the prior ruling in this case 
has been overturned, the jury verdict, which was based upon wrongly-decided and 
unworkable law, should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings to determine Arby's constitutionally and statutorily provided right to recover 
severance damages. 
With respect to the trial itself, the jury instructions were inconsistent, 
contradictory and confusing, in everyone's attempt to craft instructions that were 
consistent with Ivers I as well as other Utah precedent regarding severance damages. 
Moreover, Arby's contends UDOT's appraiser, Mr. Cook, was improperly 
allowed to give opinions that the loss of view Arby's suffered had absolutely no value. 
His opinions and testimony are out of line with this Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage, 
which discussed the problems in attempting to isolate and distinguish between 
9 
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protectable and non-protectable property rights. The district court should not have 
permitted Mr. Cook to give his opinions in the first place because they were based upon 
inadmissible hearsay, reliance upon lay opinions irrelevant to this case, and reliance upon 
evidence not of the type used by appraisers to form opinions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE 
CASE REMANDED BASED UPON THE RULING IN ADMIRAL 
BEJ^ERAGE, WHICH OVERTURNED THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT'S PRIOR RULING (IVERS I) IN THIS MATTER 
Arby's filed this appeal after the jury determined to award no severance damages 
based upon the isolated loss of view factor. Essentially, Arby's right to just 
compensation as guaranteed constitutionally and pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-
571 has remained elusive. 
While this appeal was pending, the Admiral Beverage appeal had already been 
filed and was pending. In Admiral Beverage, the Utah Supreme Court requested 
supplemental briefing from the parties on the question of whether Ivers /, the previous 
appeal in this very case, should be overruled on constitutional grounds. Pursuant to Ivers 
I, Arby's was limited at trial to seeking severance damages based upon loss of view 
caused by the elevated U.S. 89 UDOT constructed, rather than the diminution in value of 
the remnant property as a result of the taking of the severed portion. In Ivers /, the court 
held "[wjhen land is condemned as part of a single project - even if the view-impairing 
structure itself is built on property other than that which was condemned - if the use of 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as a whole.'5 Ivers I, 
154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007). 
Due to the potential the Ivers I rule could be modified, or even overturned, Arby's 
sought to have the Court stay this appeal ("Ivers III"). Arby's argued the stay should be 
imposed because this Court's decision in Admiral Beverage would have a direct impact 
on Ivers III. See Addendum C hereto. Arby's Motion to Stay Briefing was granted and 
the proceedings in Ivers III were put on hold pending the ruling in Admiral Beverage. At 
least implicitly, by imposing the stay, this Court agreed that Admiral Beverage could 
directly impact Ivers III. This Court ultimately overturned Ivers I and the stay in this 
matter remained in effect while UDOT attempted unsuccessfully to have the Admiral 
Beverage ruling reconsidered. 
Following this Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage that Ivers I had been wrongly 
decided, Arby's filed a Motion for Summary Disposition asking the Court to reverse the 
outcome in the lower court and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to 
Admiral Beverage ruling. Rather than deciding the Motion for Summary Disposition, the 
Court entered an order deferring the matter until plenary presentation on the merits and 
advised the parties that they could rest on the pleadings or address the matter further as 
they see fit in their briefing and at oral argument. See Addendum G hereto. Arby's 
hereby supplements its Motion for Summary Disposition and adds the following plenary 
presentation: 
11 
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The Court, in Admiral Beverage, determined the Ivers I holding was "too 
restrictive to accord the full protection of the Utah Constitution and is inconsistent with 
both Utah statutes and [ ] prior case law." Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 211. The 
Court held Ivers I was "wrongly decided" {id. at 214) and overturned its prior ruling in 
this case. Because Arby's has heretofore been denied its constitutional and statutory 
rights to recover severance damages, and in light of its Court's ruling in Admiral 
Beverage, Arby's asks the Court to reverse the judgment in the district court and allow 
Arby's to retry its case for severance damages based upon diminution of value of the 
remnant property. 
It would also constitute a manifest injustice if Arby's is not permitted to pursue 
severance damages under Admiral Beverage, which expressly held the prior Ivers /ruling 
was wrong. As this Court held in Admiral Beverage, it is unprecedented that a property 
owner have to seek severance damages based upon the isolation of artificial distinctions 
between what is considered protected and non-protected property rights. Admiral 
Beverage, 275 P.3d at 217-218 and 220. Arby's should be permitted to pursue remedies 
afforded by the constitution and Utah's condemnation statutes as discussed in Admiral 
Beverage. 
POINT 2 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BASED UPON IVERS I, 
WERE CONFUSING, CONTRADICTORY, AND 
INCONSISTENT, LEADING TO AN AWARD OF NO 
DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF VIEW 
What occurred at trial vividly supports this Court's recognition in Admiral 
12 
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Beverage that the Ivers I rule is unworkable. See 275 P.3d at 219-220. At trial, the 
parties and the district court; attempted to prepare jury instructions that were consistent 
with Ivers L However, the task was made difficult because of varying interpretations of 
the restrictive Ivers I holding and because of other well-settled precedent that conflicted 
with aspects of Ivers I For example, other important condemnation cases that remained 
good law in Utah following Ivers I include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 
P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); Utah Dept of Tramp, v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987); 
Utah State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others, including 
cases relied upon by the Court in its Admiral Beverage opinion. 
Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in 
condemnation cases remained intact following Ivers I. These principles became confused 
in an attempt to follow Ivers I. As has now been settled by Admiral Beverage, 
compensation for severance damages is the difference in the fair market value of the 
owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See also State v. Cooperative 
Sec. Corp, of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 247 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 
1952). This determination of fair market value can only be made by considering all of 
the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this Court stated in 
Rohan, 
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but 
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a 
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the 
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value. 
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487 P.2d at 859. See also Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 217 {quoting Weber Basin 
Water Conservary Dist v. Ward, 347 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah 1969)). 
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case revealed, the long-standing 
principle set forth in Rohan and other cases had to be ignored in order to apply the Ivers I 
holding that the jury could only consider loss of view in determining severance damages. 
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this 
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon 
Ivers I it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific 
property right that was damaged, i.e. view, or whether view was a factor to consider 
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511 for calculating severance damages, i.e., the 
reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No. 
31 informed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from 
[Arby's] property," (Jury Instructions, R. at p. 859) indicating view was to be isolated 
and valued. Jury Instruction No. 33, contained the following caveat based upon Ivers I: 
"A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be viewed by passing 
traffic and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure 
to passing traffic" (Emphasis added). Id. In other words, despite being a factor sellers 
and buyers of real property would consider in valuing real property, the jury was not 
permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's damages. 
With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided "The loss of view is 
to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway 
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structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." Id. at p. 860. This 
language attempted to reflect Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 
1974). In Miya, this Court held the obstruction in that case was to be considered in 
determining severance damages. Specifically, severance damages were to be measured 
"by the effect the obstruction of view, created by the structure, has upon the market value 
of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d at 929. However, the definition of 
market value was confusingly limited in Jury Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case 
you are to determine the fair market value of the loss of view from the defendants' 
property." (Emphasis added). Jury Instructions, R. at p. 860. Again, using Ivers I as the 
applicable law, jurors were told "just compensation includes the fair market value of the 
loss of view from defendant's property." Id. at p. 861 (Jury Instruction No. 39). Under 
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and attempt to place upon it a 
monetary value.2 
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to 
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' property by determining the 
fair market value as of December 30, 2002." Id. at p. 61 (Jury Instruction No. 40). In 
short, not only were the Jury Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible 
task of attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions 
2
 In Admiral Beverage, the Court referenced the fact that the property owner's appraisers 
testified it was "impossible to isolate and identify the values associated with loss of view 
and visibility." 275 P.3dat219. 
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caused by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into 
account in valuing real property. 
This Court, in Admiral Beverage, described the unworkability of Ivers I. First, 
"there is no set of conventions that appraisers can readily apply when they are asked to 
value a property in reference to its protected and non-protected property rights." 275 
P.3d at 219. Second, when assessing real property values, appraisers normally locate and 
analyze sales of comparable properties. Id. However, "comparable sales in which the 
buyer and seller ignore value that can be attributed to categories of certain non-
protectable property rights is simply not available." Id. The unworkability of Ivers I is 
clearly observed in the outcome of the jury trial in this matter. 
POINT 3 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING UDOT'S 
APPRAISER TO TESTIFY THAT ARBY'S SUFFERED 
NO SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony 
UDOT's appraiser, Mr. Cook, was permitted to give at trial. Cook's opinion was that 
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Addendum B 
hereto at p. 45. Prior to trial, Arby's attempted to restrict Mr. Cook's testimony through a 
motion in limine based upon the contents of the Cook appraisal report that was disclosed 
to Arby's. However, the district court denied that motion and permitted Mr. Cook to 
testify that in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses, 
Arby's had sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project. Mr. 
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Cook's opinion was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated 
fast-food restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses. See, 
generally, Addendum B hereto and Addendum H, which contains the underpinnings of 
Mr. Cook's trial testimony. 
At trial, Mr. Cook also attempted to advocate a distinction between categories of 
properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is not compensable. This 
is contrary to the Court's ruling in Admiral Beverage where an appraiser's attempt to 
make artificial distinctions was described as rank speculation. 275 P.3d at 220. In 
connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact on the value of 
Arby's remnant property, Mr. Cook took the position that view only has value for certain 
types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end residential 
properties, office spaces with views of the Wasatch Mountains, and hotel rooms with 
views of the San Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. Addendum B hereto, at pp. 
18-20. In other words, according to UDOT and its appraiser, under Ivers I constitutional 
rights are selectively applied. Just compensation is not afforded to everyone who has 
property damaged by a condemner's actions. UDOT was able to use the Ivers I decision 
to continue to deny just compensation to Arby's. Under Ivers I, Arby's property right 
was narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the jury to buy in to UDOT's claim, as 
championed by Mr. Cook, that there was no damage for loss of view. 
As already acknowledged in Admiral Beverage, the type of segregation attempted 
at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents just compensation from being awarded to 
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property owners because certain factors impacting value are disregarded and it opens the 
door to the type of testimony given by Mr. Cook that a property owner need not be 
compensated for loss of view, even when the causation element is satisfied. Arby's was 
awarded no severance damages for loss of view although it cannot be disputed the 
property's view was obstructed by UDOT's project. Zero damages does not qualify as 
just compensation for damaged property, even under Ivers /, where the district court was 
given the mandate to determine the amount of severance damages to which Arby's was 
entitled. See Ivers 27, 218 at 586 ("[the supreme court] remanded to the district court. . . 
and instructed the district court that if Arby's condemned land was essential to the 
project, the court should award Arby's appropriate damages.") 
Arby's, through its Motion in Limine, challenged the bases of Mr. Cook's no-
damage opinion, which was ultimately given at trial, as follows: 
A. Mr. Cook's Opinions Were Based Upon Inadmissible Hearsay 
Mr. Cook concluded Arby's loss of view did not negatively impact the value of 
the subject real property. His opinion was based upon opinions from lay witnesses Mr. 
Cook or his assistants allegedly interviewed. See Addendum E, at Exhibit "A" (Excerpts 
of Mr. Cook's Summary Appraisal Report). This is problematic for numerous reasons. 
First, the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court 
statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(c), UTAH R. EviD. 
Hearsay is generally inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. EviD. Mr. Cook's interviews 
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of lay witnesses do not meet any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 803, 
UTAHR.EVID.3 
This Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness based his opinion in 
part on out of court statements, "[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked in 
the form of an expert opinion, would have been impermissible and potentially highly 
prejudicial." Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay 
evidence was not admissible at trial and the district court should have granted Arby's 
Motion in Limine. 
B. Lay Witnesses are Not Qualified as Experts 
While some of Mr. Cook's interviewees are named, many of them are not 
identified and are only referenced vaguely and generally. For example, on page 51 of his 
report, Cook says he spoke with "the managers of several fast-food restaurants...." On 
page 52, he states: "We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food 
chains concerning site selection criteria and view out." Addendum H hereto. Cook 
identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but does not identify any of the 
other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he allegedly spoke. 
Moreover, insufficient information was provided concerning the background and 
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value 
of the subject real property. What are their job duties and backgrounds? Is the valuation 
3
 The interview material is hearsay upon hearsay to the extent Mr, Cook relied upon other 
parties to conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into 
his appraisal. It is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along 
statements they allegedly heard from others. 
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of loss of view any part of their job duties? These individuals are apparently involved in 
managing restaurants, but they are not real estate experts. For example, alleged 
statements of an individual named Treesa Kurtzenborn about the subject property is used 
to support Mr. Cook's opinion that Arby's suffered no damage. No information was 
given concerning Ms. Kurtzenborn's expertise or familiarity with the subject property, 
yet she freely speculates and opines that other factors impacted the value of the subject 
property more than the view obstruction. There is no foundation for such a speculative 
opinion from a lay witness and no explanation for why Mr. Cook would incorporate such 
a statement from a lay witness into his own expert opinions. It is the trial court's 
obligation to insure that an expert witness is truly testifying as an expert and not merely 
serving as a conduit through which inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United 
States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2006) ("an expert witness may not simply 
summarize the out-of-court statements of others as his testimony") (citation omitted). 
Despite Arby's objection, the district court allowed Mr. Cook to base opinions on this 
purported evidence. 
It is clear the lay witnesses Mr. Cook and his assistants interviewed were asked to 
render opinions based upon scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. Rule 702, 
UTAH R. EVID. reserves such testimony to experts who have the requisite "knowledge, 
skill, experience, training or education.55 Id. None of Mr. Cook's interviewees were 
designated as witnesses in this matter, expert or otherwise. Lay witness opinions are 
limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R. EviD., to the witness's own perception, rather 
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than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of Mr. Cook's 
interviewees was well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses and should 
have been restricted by the district court. 
C. The Lay Opinions Upon Winch Mr. Cook Relied are Irrelevant 
Mr. Cook's interview data was irrelevant. As an example, he apparently 
interviewed an assistant store manager of the Smith's store and representatives of a 
Burger King on the east side of U.S. 89, across from the subject Arby's location. These 
locations are more distant from the elevated U.S. 89 than the Arby's property. The 
Smith's store is further north than the Arby's property and does not face the highest point 
of the elevated U.S. 89. Additionally, Cook failed to explain how the lack of customer 
complaints4 about loss of view at a grocery store (or other unrelated locations) has any 
bearing on determining the loss in the fair market value of the subject property. Cook's 
appraisal was replete with this kind of irrelevant material and should have been limited 
by the trial court. 
D. The Material Mr. Cook Relied Upon was not of the Type Upon Which an 
Appraiser Reasonably Bases Opinions 
Rule 703, UTAH R. EVID. states the data upon which an expert bases his opinion 
need not be admissible in evidence if the data is "of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions...." Mr. Cook failed to explain that 
4
 Mr. Cook relied upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations 
other than subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage 
for loss of view. Even if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any 
relevance in this matter, Mr. Cook laid no foundation to show that the persons 
interviewed would have been the persons to whom customers would have complained. 
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opinions of lay witnesses, particularly those who have no familiarity with the subject 
property, are the type of facts or data upon which a licensed real estate appraiser would 
reasonably rely to value property. The material, which is not admissible due to the 
problems discussed above, is not of the type upon which an appraiser relies to appraise 
real property. Mr. Cook's opinions should have been based upon the standard of Rule 
702, UTAH R. EVID., rather than impermissible lay opinions. Therefore, Mr. Cook should 
have been excluded from relying upon it and discussing it at trial. 
E. Mr. Cook's Underlying Methodology was not Disclosed 
Not only did Cook fail to provide any foundation concerning the qualifications of 
the interviewees to render opinions, but he provided no information about the 
methodology of the interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified? 
How were the interviews conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to 
the subject property with respect to the view issue? What questions were asked? What is 
the identity of persons interviewed who are not discussed in the Cook appraisal? What 
individuals were interviewed who are not mentioned in the report? What information 
was obtained through the interview process that contradicts Cook's opinions? What 
documentation or recordings exist of the interviews? 
Arby's, based upon legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what was 
referenced in the Cook appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of 
those who were interviewed, asked the district court to limit the testimony. At a 
minimum, pursuant to Rule 705, UTAH R. EVID., the district court should have required 
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all of the facts and data underlying Cook's opinions to be disclosed to Arby's prior to 
trial. That did not occur. 
F. The District Court Failed to Exercise its Function as a Gatekeeper 
Mr. Cook's opinions did not meet the standards required under Rule 702. That 
Rule, in relevant part, provides: 
(b) Scientific, technical or otherwise specialized knowledge 
may serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific, 
technical, or other principles or methods underlying the 
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, 
(ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been 
reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is 
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such 
knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data 
and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are 
generally accepted by the relevant expert community. 
As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UTAH R. 
EviD. is to be applied to "all expert testimony." The Note continues by explaining that, 
just as in federal court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper' responsibility to 
screen out unreliable expert testimony." To fulfill this role, the Note advises that the trial 
judge should "confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should 
be "receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability." 
Because Mr. Cook relied upon irrelevant hearsay opinions from lay witnesses, his 
opinions were unreliable, yet the district court improperly refused to exclude such 
testimony and evidence at trial. 
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In short, in the wake of Admiral Beverage, Mr. Cook would have not been able to 
render the opinions he rendered on behalf of UDOT at trial. Moreover, even without the 
illumination provided by Admiral Beverage, the district court should not have permitted 
Mr. Cook to base his opinions upon inadmissible and irrelevant evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this case was tried under hers /, which has now been held to be wrongly 
decided, Arby's will be deprived of its constitutional rights if the controlling law of 
Admiral Beverage is not applied to allow further proceedings in the district court for 
Arby's to be awarded severance damages. 
DATED this l^y day of June, 2012. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
mebr 
maid J. Winder 
JMk W. Holt 
A tthrneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF' 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS; 
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and 
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Civil No. 020700665 
Judge Michael Allphin 
This matter came on for trial on April 13,14 and 15,2010, before the Honorable Michael 
Allphin of this Court. Plaintiff was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, 
and Defendants were represented by Donald Winder and John Holt. A jury of eight persons was 
regularly impaneled and sworn to try said action. Witnesses on behalf of both parties were sworn 
and testified. After hearing the evidence, arguments of counsel and the instructions of the Court, 
the jury retired to consider their verdict, taking with them the exhibits which had been offered 
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and received and the written instructions of the Court. TheS jury subsequently returned to the 
Court and, through its foreman, said that they find a UT<III i ioi Ihr 11.unlit 1 ,md it^insi I In 
Defendants as follows: 
[We] find in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in 
that the Defendants have failed to prove damages for diminuation 
of fair market value for loss of view and we decline to award the 
Defendants a monetary sum. 
TOTAL AWARD $0.00 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premise aforesaid,, It Is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that James Ivers and P and F Food Services, 
Defendants herein, recover from the State of Utah, no further monies; a stipulation and award of 
$104,500 having been stipulated to and ordered on the 6th day of June, 2003, leaving a balance of 
$0 00 < >wed by the State of Utah b> Defendants. 
DATED this /f*day of -/nAM^* 2010, 
(J 'BY THE GUI-1* 
MCHAELALLPHINy 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
D©TULD WINDER 
JOHMHOLT 
AtraqiW for Defendants 
Judgment on Verdict 
Davis County Civil No, 020 700665 
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WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
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Secretary 
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u n d e r t h e b r i d g e ? 
A, Yes 
Q. Okay , l e t ' s l o o k a t s l i d e 3 0 , s h o w i n g t h e d i s t a n c e s . 
You" v e :i n d i c a 1: e d t h a t 11 i e d i s t a n c e s „. > i I 1 i I <= • a v e r a g e
 r a r e a 
.1 ] ttle bit. shy of 200 feet? 
A. Yeah, 192 is what we measure from the store, itself/ 
1 ,i :, the waJ 1 11 s a] : »: :>i it 65 feet from 1 :he property line tc > the 
wall. 
Q. Okay. Is it reasonable to review -- to refer to this 
as a' upartial view impairment''? . 
A. Certainly it's only a partial view impairment. 
There's no -
Q. There's not a total view impairment? 
A. — there's no material view impairment in most 
directions, but to the east there is a partial view impairment.. 
Q. Is vi ew an important amenity for real estate? 
I !i It cai I be . 
Q. What, type of real estate is view important to? 
A. Resort hotels overlooking the ocean, a view would be 
/ e 2 } i nip o i 1: a i t I I i g l I e i i < :i 1: I c >me s :i i I r e - 3 o r 1: s e 1 1 :i n g s a \ :i = i ? :i s 
an amenity for which buyers will pay a premium. 
Q. How about industrial properties? 
A Indi is 1:ri a 1 properties are no 1: boI igI I 1: f oi vj ew oi i1:. 
Most: industrial buildings don't have windows. They're — 
they may have a few windows in the office area, but industrial 
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buildings are typically designed for either storage where 
they're stacking inventory along the outside walls, as well 
as throughout the center of the building, and so they don't 
have windows; or it's manufacturing, where they don't want 
employees to be looking out the window while they' re — while 
they're working, for safety purposes. 
Q. How about the view in, visibility; is that important 
to an industrial property? 
A. It can be. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Well, some industrial businesses are — they'll have 
a what we call a "showroom warehouse." So like a lot of home 
construction materials companies like tile companies will 
like to advertise and get people into their showroom. They 
are actually selling wholesale to the contractors, but the 
homeowner's picking out the goods. So if they can be exposed 
to, say, a freeway or something, and have that visibility, that 
can help their business. 
Q. Is it customary for them to put some — their name or 
some advertising on the outside of the building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does that contribute — that visibility contribute to 
an industrial property? 
A. An industrial user that is worried about — or is 
hopeful to get some recognition from the marketplace, that's 
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e x a c 1 1 y w h a t I h e y w n n 1 t . -1- -
Q. It provides some name recognition? 
A. Right, but there are a lot of industrial users that 
d o n " t c a r e . T h i s i s s o r t < > I »i inii qin 1 J I I 1 f g r o u p n f i n< 111,1. t r J a 
users where there's some advantage to that disability. 
Q. So the visibility in is different than the visibility 
out; is that what you're saying? 
A. Significantly. 
Q. Okay, how about fast food restaurants; is view out an 
important amenity to a fast food restaurant? 
I It ] s not II .:, wasi i 1: j i sted in 1:1 le criteria of site 
selection for fast food operators. It wasn't something that in 
my varied discussions with individuals who are involved in that 
f
 sines s identified as ai I i ssi le . I've a J so studied :i 1: with 
specific paired sales suggested is not an amenity that fast 
food restaurants care about. 
W1 i e r e a r e f a s 1: f o o d r e s t a u. r a. i I 1: s t y p i c a J I y 1 o c a t e d ? 
They are typically located along freeway interchanges 
cr in front of shopping centers. Ideally, both. 
( Is that for their convenience? 
11ight, it's for convenience, it's for visibility, it's 
for accessibility. 
Q. I believe you said fast food restaurants are freqi ie itl} r 
located at highway/freeway intersections. 
A They are. 
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Q. BY MR. HUNTER: I s i t customary t o rev iew b u s i n e s s 
t e x t s ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you review those texts in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You refer yesterday to a textbook or a — I don't know 
if it's a textbook, but a book on fast food restaurants — 
A. Yes, some — 
Q. — by Mr. Milvane — Mella — 
A. Mellafanny. 
Q. — Mellafanny, okay. It's easy for you to say. Did 
he note the view out as a criteria of a fast food restaurant? 
MR. WINDER: Judge, I'm going to object. We've plowed 
this ground already. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection at this point. 
I think you are — I thought maybe you were just going to just 
move right through, but you're covering the same thing we did 
yesterday. 
Q. BY MR. HUNTER: Okay, and did you interview managers of 
any of these fast food stores? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did they tell you anything different than what you 
previously learned? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay, so let's move to your data. You've conducted 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
1 i 
15 
16 
3 ? 
18" 
19 
20 
2] 
22 
23 
24 
25 
t h i s background, y o u ' v e v i s i t e d 11 ie s:i 1:e a J o 1:, you v i s j 1:ed 
a l o t of o t h e r s i t e s , you 've i n t e r v i e w e d a l o t of p e o p l e , 
you 've r e a d t h e — what you c o n s i d e r a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e x t s on 
..
 t o j e c 1: W1 I a 1: d i d y :) i i d o i I e x 1: ? 
Ultimately an appraiser needs to go to the-market 
to see how the market reacts. I mean, I can talk to all these 
people, I can review what's written on this, and that's pretty 
darn good anecdotal evidence; but I need to go to the market, 
to see if buyers and sellers transact land sales, property 
sales on a different basis if there's a view impairing issue 
associated with it. 
Q. So'all of that's just anecdotal information. Now it's 
time to - where the rubber meets the road? 
1 ! JE 1; 3 gl it yes . 
Q. What did you do? 
A. So this is a retail property, It's imperative in 
app r a i s i n g 11 i a t w e c omp a r e J :i k e k i i I d p r op e r t i e s S c • w e J o o k 
for retail sites, not other types of sites, but like office 
or industrial or whatever. We look at retail sites, and I foil 
I try to find sales of view impaired si tes, and sal es of 
non-view impaired sites so that I could measure the difference. 
If i t's called "paired sales analysis," which 
is a tech — a quantitative technique used to identify and 
measure adjustments to the sale prices for rents of comparable 
properties, to apply this technique,* sales or rental data on 
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Q. Why is this data collection process so important to an 
MAI appraiser? 
A. You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but 
their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base 
their opinion. We have a standards obligation,, an ethical 
obligation to provide appraisal work in a non — 
Q. Want to pull the microphone back towards — 
A. — in a non-misleading way, and to prove our — prove 
our opinions. Not just to pull something out of the air, but 
to actually prove our opinions. Even though there's a lot of. 
anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not 
something these fast food operators particularly care about, 
we need to go to the market to confirm that. 
Q. So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in 
forming your opinions? 
A. Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my 
sole reliance. 
,Q. Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case 
studies? 
A. That I cannot is — I cannot find in the marketplace 
where this changed the subject's situation, specifically 
related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding 
accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which 
I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court, 
that just this view impairment has no impact on market value. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's the conclusion of your data? 
Yes „ 
Is that supported by your other research? 
-42 
A. 11 i i 3. 
• Q. Does it surprise you that you couldn't find any value 
for that view out? 
A. It doesn't. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Because of how common it is in this imperfect world 
that — that view impairment, especially in situations next to 
the highway, where you're trying -to attract highway business, 
how common that is, and why a business would locate in that 
situation if it were — if it were that critical of a factor. 
So I in i iot si 11 pi ised by the results. 
Q. Now, I've asked you to look at a book by Misters 
Bell and Oral Anderson, published by the American -- or the 
Ap p i a i s a J 11 I s 1: :i t u t e, t i t ] e d "l x R e a 1 E s t a t e D a. in a g e s 1 1 a v e \ • :> u 
looked 
A. 
(,), 
A . 
Q-
second 
A 
: Q . 
at that book? 
Yes. 
Y o i i' r e f am:i 1 :i a i w:i 11 I 1:1: I a t b o o k ? 
I am 
In fact, I had the first edition, i m d you gave me the 
edition; is tha 1: i: :i g 1' i1:? 
Yes. 
A newer mod - - newer version of it. is this approach 
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A. I did., 
Q. You obtained anecdotal evidence — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — from market participants; and based upon that 
effort, that research, what was your conclusion? 
A. I couldn't isolate or prove or identify any value, loss 
or value diminution related to this partial view impairment out 
to the east, or this fast food restaurant property. 
MR. HUNTER: Thank you. Your Honor, might I approach 
for a moment? 
THE COURT: Please. 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
Q. BY MR. HUNTER: So just to conclude, it is your 
professional opinion that the view out from the Arby's 
restaurant has no monetary value? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Thank you. If you can stay, because we're going to 
need to review some of these, if that's okay? 
A. I guess so. 
Q. I don't know how you got that set up. All right, 
thank you. Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WINDER: 
Q. Good morning, Mr. Cook. 
A. Good morning, Mr. Winder. 
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A. Yes, that's my testimony. 
Q. All right, and — and it's 20 to 22 feet high? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How wide is this? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. It's quite a distance. It's got how many lanes of 
traffi c in each direction? 
A. I believe it has two lanes of traffic in each 
direction. 
Al 1 • r i ght, 11 id 1: I : > w I ong i s t :h i s obs t ru ct i on, f r oin 
where to where? How long does it run? 
A. How long is the road, or how long is the --
Q.. Elevated. Ilow long is the road as elevated here? 
A. Probably three-quarters a mile to the north and a half 
mile to the south. No, actually it probably continues elevated 
even beyond a half mile to the south. 
•jhav, now we — we agree that view is a component of 
value for at least some properties? 
A. Yes. 
Q A1 3 r :i g 1 I t , a i i d a i I e x a nip 1 e w o i I .3 d b e a r e s a s :i i I g I e 
family residence in a mountain resort? 
A.- Yes. 
Q 11: c oi i ,3 d a 1 s o b e a. i I c f f i c e J:> i i :i 1 d :i n g w 1 I e r e s ome o i i € m a y 
ivhnt to look at the Wasatch and pay a little more rent, as 
opposed to.looking at a building right next door; could be in 
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that kind of situation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, it could be as individuals. If we wanted 
to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay 
more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the — or the bay 
than something else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. So a buyer, renter or tenant in these 
situations may pay more for a view? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Our disagreement, Mr. Cook, in this case, is with the 
ultimate issue. That is, does the impairment of view that's 
been lost by the Arby' s operation, did they suffer any damage 
because of it. That's our difference. 
A. Yes, that's why we're here. 
Q. That's why we're here, okay. Now, let's talk about 
some of these — and I'm sorry, I — a copy of the slides that 
I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than 
yours. In purple and at my age, there's — I'm sorry, there's 
no way I can read that, but' if — 
A. If you tell me what it is, then I'll — 
Q. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, So let's — 
let's review some of these slides, and talk about them. Irm on 
page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel. My copies are 
teeny, tiny. We had it there, yeah. Good. I can't read the 
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DONALD J. WINDER #3519 
JOHN W.HOLT .#5720 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS, 
and P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant), 
Defendants/Appellants, 
YD. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
PlaintifflAppellee. 
APPELLANTS' MOTION 
TO STAY BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
District Court No. 020700665 
Utah Supreme Court No. 20100511 
Appellants (referred to herein collectively as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, and 
pursuant to Rule,23, UTAH R, APP. P.? hereby respectfully move the Court to stay the briefing 
schedule in this matter pending the outcome of Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral 
Beverage Corporation (Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC) (^Admiral Beverage"). 
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FACTUAL GROUNDS FOR RELIEF SOUGHT 
This is A rby's ti u rd apj >eal before the I Jtah Sup] em e Co i irt J" Vrby's f ;:•: the present 
appeal following the jury trial conducted in the Second Judicial District Court in April, lo i (• A.s 
; • \\r ' .\ i . i . i , ' i > 'tiWHti ' *\'>>r :*>< . r a " iv P i * ' I l i a * ' ^ • \ 'H- ' ' • " • i u . g 
before this Court. In Admiral Beverage, this Court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of 
whether this Court' 's i tiling in Ivei 's 1 "shoi ild be overruled on constiti itional groi iiicis " A tn le 
and correct copy'of the June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and Rehearing is attached 
hereto The supplemental briefing is now ^ in; mi.- •</. •...-•• i n--cra^ u-, . 
Arby's filed a motion to file an amicus brief in the Admiral Beverage case. The motion was 
granted and Arby's recently filed its brief. 
The Court, on August 30, 2010, established a briefing schedule in this matter. Arby's is 
currently required to file its opening brief on or before October 12, 21) 10. Because the ruling in 
Admit .' R .*, / .7?i- could have a direct impact on this appeal, the briefing schedule in this matter 
should be stayed" 
ARGUMENT 
Courts have the inherent and discretionary power to grant a stay of proceedings. See 
I ewis i ' Mi mliree 627 P 2d 94 , , 96 (I Jtah 1981). Courts; commonly grant stays where there are 
other actions pending that involve either identical parties and issues and where the decision of 
1
 The prior appeals herein were Ivers v. UDOT9 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) fivers F) and UDOT 
v hers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009) {"Ivers II"). 
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one settles the issues in the other, or "when the decision in an action is essential to the decision in 
another." ii£ 
In the present matter, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Admiral Beverage will 
have a direct impact on this appeal. In fact, the constitutionality of the Utah Supreme Court's 
prior ruling, Ivers I is being considered in Admiral Beverage, Supplemental briefing has been 
conducted on that issue and Arby's has filed its an amicus brief due to the direct impact the 
Court's decision will have on its present appeal. If the constitutionality of Ivers I is being 
evaluated, neither the parties nor the Court should expend time and resources in this matter until 
the issues in Admiral Beverage are ruled upon and the impact upon this case is known. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Arby's respectfully requests this Court grant this Motion to 
Stay the Briefing Schedule pending the outcome of Admiral Beverage, 
DATED this \\ J day of September, 2010. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
laid J. Winder 
Jbhk W. Holt 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of September, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING SCHEDULE to be emailed and 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randy Hunter 
Attorney Generals Office 
160 East 3 00 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874 
randyhunter@utah.gov 
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IK THE SUPREME COURT OF THE SIATE DP UTAH 
FILED 
I !TAH APPELLATE COURTS 
I l l 2 3 2010 
Case No. 20081054 
ooOOO 
Utah Department of Transportation; 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Park City West & Associates; 
valley Bank & Trust Company; 
and Valley Mortgage Company, 
Defendants and Petitioner. 
ORDER FOB, SOT^ LEMElTOMi BRIEFING 
MSD KEHH&KIWG 
The court hereby requests further briefing and orders 
rehearing in this a&sa, which will be scheduled as soon as 
possible after the vacancy currently existing on the court is 
filled, 
Specificallyr the court requests the parties to briei une 
question of whether Ivers v, Utah Department of Transportation, 
154 P,3d 802 (CJT 2007) should he overruled on constitutional 
grounds. 
The briefing shall comply with the court's general rules. 
Petitioner's brief shall be filed by August 16, Respondent's 
brief by September 16, and the Reply brief by October lf i. 
The parties' original.briefs will also be considered on 
rehearing- ,The matter will thereafter be calendared for oral 
argument„ 
FOR THE COURT; 
Dated W J? za/0 
Christine M* Durham 
Chief Justice 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 23, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of ehe foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered toj 
REED L MARTINEAU 
DAVID JASON HAWKINS 
SHOW CKRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PL 11TH FL 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY XJT 84145-5000 
BRENT A BURNETT 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
150 E 300 S 5TH FL 
PO BOX 140856 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0858 
Dated this June 23, 2010. 
Judicial Assistant 
Case No. 20081054 
District Court No. 970905361 
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CERTTF'TilATF c>F SRi-'VTi'T, 
I hereby certify that on October 4, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
DONALD J. WINDER 
JOHN W HOLT 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 W 200 S #4000 
PO BOX 2 668 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2668 
BRENT A BURNETT 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 5TH FL 
PO BOX 140858 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0858 
Dated this October 4, 2010. 
Case No. 20100511 
District Court No. 020700665 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
O C T - * 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--00O00— 
James Ivers, Katherin G. Havas, 
and P and F Food Services, 
Appellants, 
v. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 
Appellees. 
Case No. 20100511-SC 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Appellantsr motion to 
stay briefing pending the outcome of Case Number 2 008 1054, Utah 
Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage. The motion is 
granted. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION 
Defendant/Appellant 
1 Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC 
•i 
BRIEF OF JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE HAVAS AND P and F FOOD 
SERVICES 
AS AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION 
DONALD J. WINDER#3519 
JOHN W. HOLT #5720 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
175 W. 200 S., Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae James Ivers, 
Katherine Havas and P and F Food 
Services 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
• Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
• Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." (Emphasis added). 
• UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511: 
The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered 
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess: 
*p *r 1* *J* *»' 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which 
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by 
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein 
collectively as "Arby's") are the parties to the very case this Court intends to reconsider, 
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P3d 802 (Utah 2007) (referred to herein 
as "Ivers I"). Following the recent trial in the Ivers case, Arby's filed a new appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, Case No. 
20100511-SC. The difficulties in applying Ivers I are what led to the outcome 
1 
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necessitating a new appeal in Ivers. Because the Ivers case has now actually been tried 
under the law set down in Ivers I Arby's can provide additional insight and analysis 
concerning why the Ivers I ruling is problematic with respect to the distinction between 
view and visibility in determining severance damages. The Court's decision in the 
present matter is of great interest to Arby's and will have a direct impact on its pending 
appeal. 
' STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and 
Rehearing in this matter, it appears the issue to be considered is whether the distinction in 
Ivers I between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a property owner's right to 
recover severance damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT 
Arby's is filing this Amicus Brief in support of Admiral Beverage Corporation's 
position that the distinction between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a 
property owner's right to recover just compensation. Arby's does not dispute the 
appropriateness of the causation analysis of Ivers I which adopts the "essential" test. The 
causation analysis does not need to be reconsidered. 
After its long history in the appellate court system, the Ivers case was finally tried 
in Second District Court on April 13-15, 2010. Pursuant to this Court's mandate, the sole 
issue to be tried was the amount of severance damages relating to Arby's loss of view. 
The difficulties encountered in applying Ivers I at trial highlights the constitutional 
2 
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problems with the ruling. The parties and the district court attempted to instruct the jury 
based upon their often inconsistent interpretations of Ivers L The process was 
challenging, particularly when attempting to reconcile other well-settled principles of 
condemnation law. 
Additionally, over objection, UDOT's appraiser was permitted to base his 
professional opinion that Arby's had sustained no damage. This opinion is based in part 
on irrelevant and unsupported interviews of lay witnesses, such as managers of unrelated 
fast food restaurants. UDOT's appraiser was also permitted to testify that there is a 
distinction between properties where loss of view is compensable and where it is not 
compensable. In other words, he suggested to the jury that there are property types where 
an owner, such as Arby's, is not entitled to the constitutionally protected right of just 
compensation for damage caused to remnant property by an obstruction of view. 
According to this appraiser, compensation for loss of view would be reserved for things 
like high end resort properties with mountain views. 
Although this Court's mandate was for the trial court to determine Arby's 
damages, the jury ultimately awarded no severance damages to Arby's. The jury verdict 
was inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Arby's view had been damaged by UDOT's 
construction project. Arby's was denied just compensation under the application of Ivers 
I. 
Just compensation in a case involving a claim for severance damages is, and 
should be, based upon the diminution in fair market value of the remnant property. The 
3 
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distinction in Ivers I between view and visibility is confusing, overly complex, and 
restricts the jury's consideration of factors required to fairly and fully value property and 
award appropriate severance damages. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's distinction 
between view and visibility should be overturned as an unconstitutional limitation on a 
property owner's right to recover severance damages. 
ARGUMENT 
Private property rights are protected by both the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. Both of these 
documents, which set the very foundations for state and federal law, prohibit the taking of 
property without just compensation. As thoroughly outlined in Admiral Beverage's 
Supplemental Brief, Utah's Constitution provides even.broader protection than the United 
States Constitution by including language that property will not be damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 
Utah's condemnation statutes, which must be interpreted and applied consistent 
with the constitutional mandates, provide as follows with respect to severance damages: . 
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence 
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
determine and assess: 
# # jjc 3JC * # 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only 
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
the [condemning authority]. (Emphasis added). 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511. 
Originally, Arby's claim for severance damages included claims that the value of 
its remnant property was damaged by UDOT's taking of a portion of Arby's property 
used to eliminate the traditional intersection at Shepard Lane and U.S. 89 in Farmington, 
Utah. Arby's property is located on the northwest comer of the former intersection at 
Shepard Lane and U.S. 89. Not only was direct access to Arby's remnant property 
eliminated, but, as this Court pointed out in Ivers /, the property's view and visibility 
were blocked by UDOT's elevation of U.S. 89 immediately east of Arby's remnant 
property. Ivers I 154 P.3d at 804. Arby's journey through the appellate courts began 
when the trial court granted UDOT's motion in limine, precluding Arby's from presenting 
any evidence of severance damages to a jury. Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. 
Essentially, the Court of Appeals determined that because the portion of UDOT's 
construction project that interfered with Arby's property rights was not itself constructed 
on property taken from Arby's, causation for severance damages was not established. 
Ivers v. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005). 
Following the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, the Utah Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, but only on the issue of whether loss of view and visibility are factors in 
awarding severance damages. In short, this Court was called upon to address the Court of 
Appeals' causation analysis and to determine whether loss of view and visibility are 
appropriately considered in connection with awarding severance damages. 
5 
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With respect to causation, this Court properly rejected UDOT's assertion that in 
order to recover severance damages, the view-impairing structure must be built directly 
upon the severed land. Ivers I, 154 P.2d at 807. This Court held: 
When land is condemned as part of a single project - even if 
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other 
than that which was condemned - if the use of the condemned 
property is essential to the completion of the project as a 
whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages. 
Id 
However, this Court went on to distinguish between view and visibility, and held 
there is no protected property right in visibility. Id. At 805-06. Therefore, Arby's was 
precluded from presenting evidence of claimed damage related to loss of visibility. Id. 
Not only will the Ivers I ruling impact other property owners seeking just 
compensation, such as Admiral Beverage, but the Ivers case itself has now been in the 
crucible of the trial court and the effect of the Supreme Court's holding can be evaluated 
under the light of actual experience. 
At trial, the parties and the district court attempted to prepare jury instructions that 
were consistent with Ivers I. However, the task was made difficult because of differing 
interpretations of the Ivers I ruling and because of other well-settled precedent that 
conflict with aspects of Ivers I For example, other important condemnation cases that 
remain good law in Utah include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 
(Utah 1974); Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987); Utah 
State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others. 
6 
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Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in 
condemnation cases remains intact following Ivers L These principles became confused 
in an attempt to follow Ivers I. Compensation for severance damages is the difference in 
the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See, 
e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 247 
P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952). This determination of fair market value can only be made by 
considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this 
Court stated in Rohan, 
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but 
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a 
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the 
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value. 
487 P.2d at 859. 
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case reveal, the long-standing principle 
set forth in Rohan must be ignored in order to apply the Ivers I holding that loss of view 
is considered, but loss of visibility is not. 
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this 
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon 
Ivers I, it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific 
property right that was damaged, i.e. view1, or whether view was a factor to consider 
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B~6-511 for calculating severance damages, i.e., the 
1
 Attempts to isolate and appraise separate items of damages were rejected by this Court 
mito/zOT.487P.2dat859. 
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reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No. 
31 informed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from 
[Arby's] property/5 indicating view was to be isolated and valued. (A copy of the Ivers 
Jury Instructions are attached hereto as Addendum "A"). Jury Instruction No. 33, 
contained the following caveat based upon hers I: "A property owner adjoining a public 
highway has no right to be viewed by passing traffic and is not entitled to any 
compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing traffic" (Emphasis 
added). In other words, despite being a factor sellers and buyers of real property would 
consider, the jury was not permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's 
damages. 
With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided "The loss of view is 
to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway 
structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." This instruction was 
offered by Arby's in an attempt to reflect Miya. In Miya, this Court held the obstruction 
in that case was to be considered in determining severance damages. Specifically, 
severance damages were to be measured "by the effect the obstruction of view, created by 
the structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d 
at 929. However, the definition of market value was confusingly limited in Jury 
Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case you are to determine the fair market value of 
the loss of view from the defendants5 property." (Emphasis added). Again, using Ivers I 
as guidance, jurors were told "just compensation includes the fair market value of the loss 
•8 
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of view from defendant's property." Addendum "A" at Jury Instruction No. 39. Under 
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and place upon it a monetaiy 
value. 
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to 
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' property by determining the 
fair market value as of December 305 2002. Id. at Jury Instruction No. 40. In short, not 
only were the Jury Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible task of 
attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions caused 
by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into account in 
valuing real property. The jury instructions were drafted pursuant to the parties' best 
efforts to comply with Ivers I. 
The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony 
UDOT's appraiser, Phillip Cook, was permitted to give at trial Cook's opinion was that 
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Prior to trial, 
Arby's attempted to restrict Cook's testimony through a motion in limine. (A copy of the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum "B"). 
However, the district court denied the motion in limine and permitted Cook to testify that 
in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses, Arby's had 
sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project. Cook's opinion 
was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated fast-food 
restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses. See, generally, 
9 
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Addendum "B'\ At trial, Cook also advocated that a distinction can legitimately be made 
between categories of properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is 
not compensable. In connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact 
on the value .of Arby's remnant property, Cook took the position that view only has value 
for certain types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end 
residential properties, office spaces with views of the Wasatch Mountains, and hotel 
rooms with views of the San Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. (A copy of 
portions of Cook's trial testimony is attached hereto as Addendum "C"). In other words, 
according to UDOT and its appraiser, under Ivers I the constitutional rights are 
selectively applied. Just compensation is not afforded to everyone who has property 
damaged by a condemnor's actions. UDOT was able to use the Ivers I decision to 
continue to deny just compensation to Arby's. Under Ivers 7, Arby's property right was 
narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the -jury to buy in to UDOT's claim there 
was no damage. 
The type of segregation attempted at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents 
just compensation from being awarded to property owners because certain factors 
impacting value are disregarded and it opens the door to the type of testimony given by 
Phillip Cook that a property, owner need not be compensated for loss of view, even when 
the causation element is satisfied. In Ivers, Arby's was awarded no severance damages 
for loss of view although it was undisputed the property's view has been obstructed. Zero 
damages does not qualify as just compensation for damaged property. 
10 
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Arby's agrees with Admiral Beverage and submits the ruling in Ivers I is 
unconstitutional inasmuch as it interferes with the constitutional mandate of just 
compensation, as revealed by the results of the Ivers trial itself. Attempting to isolate the 
issue of loss of view prevents a property owner from being made whole based upon a fair 
comparison of property value before and after the talcing. See Utah State Road 
Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) ("just compensation means the 
owners must be put in as good as position money wise as they would have occupied had 
their property not been taken"). The distinction between loss of view and visibility 
resulted in a denial of Arby's constitutional rights. That result will be perpetuated in 
other cases if the decision is allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Arby's, as Amicus Curiae, respectfully requests this 
Court overturn the portion of the Ivers I ruling that distinguishes between view and 
visibility as factors to be evaluated in determining severance damages. 
Respectfully submitted this 0 day of September, 2010. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
n ?}NALD J. WINDER W.HOLT 
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ADDENDUM 
.A. Ivers Jury Instructions 
B. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine 
C. Excerpts of Phillip Cook Trial Testimony 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE. OF UTAH.'.' 
. UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
. Plaintiff, • 
vs. 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERME G. HAVAS; 
.and P AND F FOOD. SERVICES (Tenant), 
Defendants. • 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 020700665 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
Ladies and'Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one (1) through 
twenty-one (21), given to you at the beginning of the trial. You will receive additional 
instructions at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your 
conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be carefully followed. 
Dated this day: 4-/51Q 
m DISTRICT COUKf PUDGE 
MICHAEL Gt^XPHTN 
y S S ^ 
itl , Op- !>& 
si 
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1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Before the trial of this case begins, I need to give you some instructions to help you. 
understand what you will see and hear. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff is the " 
UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. The party who is being sued is. calledthe 
defendant, hi this case the defendants are JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G, HA.VAS, and P • 
AND F FOOD SERVICES. . 
The defendants seek damages for- diminutionof fair .market value for loss of view •..... 
resulting frorn the condemnation of their property and the construction of an elevated 
public highway. 
The plaintiff has already compensated the defendants for all other damages related to the 
. condemnation of the defendants' property. 
2. GENERAL ADMONITIONS 
You have now been sworn as jurors in this case. I want to impress on you the seriousness 
of being a juror. You must come to the case without bias and attempt to reach a fair verdict based 
on the evidence and on the law. Before we begin,, I need to explain how to conduct yourselves 
during the trial. 
Do not allow anything that happens outside this courtroom to affect your decision. During 
the trial do not talk about this case with anyone, including your family, friends, or even your 
fellow jurors until after I tell you that it is time for you to decide the case. When it is time to 
decide the case, you will meet in the jury room. You may discuss the case only in the jury room, 
at the end of the trial, when all of the jurors are present. After the trial is over and I have released 
you from the jury, you may discuss the case with anyone, but you are not required to do so. 
During the trial do not read about the case in the newspapers or on the internet or listen to 
radio or television broadcasts about the trial. If a headline or an announcement catches your 
attention, do not read or listen further. Media accounts may be inaccurate or may contain matters 
that are not evidence, 
You must decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this trial and the 
instructions that I provide. Do not investigate the case or conduct any experiments. Do not do any 
research on your own or as a group. Do not use dictionaries, the internet, or other reference 
materials, Do not contact anyone to assist you. Do not visit or view the scene of the events in this 
case. If you happen to pass by the scene do not stop or investigate. 
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Evidence can only be presented one piece at a 
time. Do not form or express an opinion about the case while the trial is going on. You must not 
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. decide on a verdict until after you have heard all of the evidence and have discussed it thoroughly 
with your fellow jurors in your deliberations. • • ' ' . -
• • Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your verdict .:. . . 
.At the end of the trial, Twill explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict..- •'. 
'. - You must follow the law' as I explain it to you, even'if yo'irdo not agree with'the law.':,:- .••.-'. . !: • 
3. FURTHER ADMONITION ABOUT ELECTRONIC DEVICES . : . 
•. .<••-. • -Serious-problems have'been caused around the country by jurors using -computer, and . •• 
. • electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigates:case, or to share..-•'.• 
withothers our thoughts about the trial, and ifs easy to do so with the internet/and instant ; • 
communication devices or services, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so on. . 
• .* . However, please understand that the .rules of evidence and procedure have developed, over 
hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the entire . 
system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your decisions based on'evidence presented 
.to you in court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as jurors if you 
conduct your own investigations or communicate about this trial with others. 
Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling" the 
parties, issues, or counsel;. "Twittering" with fid ends about the trial; using Blackberries or 
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial updates on Facebook pages; using. 
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, and so on. Even using something as seemingly 
innocent as "Google Maps" can result in a: mistrial. 
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they 
are discovered, they will be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to be retried, • 
at substantial cost. ' ' . 
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror. 
So I must warn you again - do not use your cell phone or computer to investigate or 
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do no interest research 
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so. . 
4. ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LAWYERS 
You and I and the lawyers are all officers of the court, and we play important roles in the 
trial 
It's my role to supervise the trial and to decide all legal questions, such as deciding 
objections to evidence and deciding the meaning of the law. I will also instruct you on the law 
that you must apply. 
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It's your role to follow:.that law and .to decide.:what\fhe facts are. The facts generally relate 
to who, what, when, why, and how or how much. The facts must be supported by evidence. 
Neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case. That is your role. You should decide the case 
based upon the evidence.presented in court, and the instructions that I give you. • • .
 : 
It's the lawyers' role to present evidence, generally by calling and questioning witnesses 
and presentmg.exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to decide-the-case in favor of«. 
his or her client, • . 
Things that you see on television and in the movies may not accurately reflect the way 
real trials should be conducted. -Real trials should be conducted with professionalism, courtesy 
and civility. : • • < . - . . . • . • 
5. ORDER OF TRIAL 
The trial will generally.proceeds follows: . 
(1) Opening statements. The lawyers will make opening statements, outlining what the 
case is about and what they think the evidence will show. 
(2) Presentation of evidence. The defendants will offer evidence first, followed by the 
plaintiff. The parties may later offer more evidence, called rebuttal evidence, after hearing the 
witnesses and seeing the exhibits. 
(3) Instructions on the law. Throughout the trial and after the evidence has been fully 
presented, I will instruct you on the law that you must apply. You must obey these instructions. 
You are not allowed to reach decisions that go against the law. 
(4) Closing arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will . 
share with you their views of the evidence, how is relates to the law and how they think you 
should decide the case. 
(5) Jury deliberations. The final step is for you to go to the jury room and discuss the case 
among yourselves until you reach a verdict. Your verdict must be based on the evidence 
presented in court and on my instmctions on the law. I will give you more instructions about that 
step at a later time. 
6. SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS NOT SIGNIFICANT 
From time to time throughout the trial, I will instruct you on the law. The order in which I 
give the instmctions has no significance. You must consider the instructions in their entirety, 
giving them all equal weight. I do not intend to emphasize any particular instruction, and neither 
should you. 
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7.r, JURORS MUST FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS 
.•.. •:: • .: The instructions that I give you are the'.law-, and your oath- requires you to. follow ,my: ••••". >•' 
..instructions even if you disagr.ee with.them. •••.. :.. > . : > • • • : • ' . . • • . • • • •••..:••;...--.', ••-:.-.•• 
8. JURORS MAY NOT DECIDE BASED ON SYMPATHY, PASSION, AND. .. 
;. •-• • . . P R E J U D I C E - - - ^ , . , " : .-•••• •'••..•:-;;:-••-•/, 
..You must not decide this case for or against anyone because you feel sorry for .anyone
 ;pr . 
• angry at-anyone.. You must decide this case based on the facts and the law, without regard to ••.. -.;•.• 
sympathy> passion'dr^prejudice: ••• . . •...-; ..•*.•• .v:-. ••.,:•- •';.-••".. . :• . - ••,-••.;••: 
9. NOTE-TAKING . , . . . y - .. • 
If you wish, you may take notes during the trial and have those notes with you when you -. 
. discuss the case.. We will provide you with writing materials if you need them. -If you. take notes, • 
do not over do it, and .do not let your note-taking distract you from following the evidence, and . , 
you. should use them- only as a tool to aid your personal memory when it comes time to decide the, 
case. • 
10. RULES APPLICABLE TO RECESSES 
From time to time, I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break,, 
overnight or longer. You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess. You 
must obey the following instructions during the recesses: 
Do not talk about this ease with .anyone - not family, friends or even each other. While 
you are in the courthouse, the clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so 
that people will not try to discuss the case withyou. • 
If anyone tries to discuss the case in your presence, despite your telling them not to, tell 
the clerk or the bailiff that you need to see me. If you must talk to me, do not discuss it with your 
fellow jurors. 
Although it is normal human tendency to talk with other people, do not talk or otherwise 
communicate with any of the parties or their lawyers or with any witness, By this, I mean do not 
talk with them at all, .even to pass the time of day. 
Finally, do not make up your mind about what the verdict should be until after you have 
gone to the jury room to decide the case, and you and your fellow jurors have discussed the 
evidence. Keep an open mind until then. 
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11. PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
• When I tell you that a party has the burden of proof-or that a party must prove something 
by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must persuade you, by the evidence... 
presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be true than not true. 
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be beyond a reasonable, doubt, but 
I must emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case. In a civil case such as this one, .a 
different level of proof applies; proof by a preponderance of evidence. 
Another way of saying this is proof by the. greater weight of the evidence, however slight 
Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of witnesses nor the-amount of . 
testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence, in weighing the 
evidence, you should consider all of the evidence that applies to a fact, no matter which party 
presented it. The weight given to each piece of evidence is for you do decide- • 
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more likely true than not, 
then you must find that the fact has been proved. On the other hand, if you decide that the 
evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must find that the fact has not been 
proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that fact. 
At the close of the trial, I will instruct you in more detail about the specific elements that 
must be proved. 
12. EVIDENCE 
"Evidence" is anything that tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact. It can be the 
testimony of a witness or documents or objects or photographs or stipulations or certain qualified 
opinions or any combination of these things. 
You must entirely disregard any evidence for which I sustain an objection and any 
evidence that I order to be struck. 
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and you must 
entirely disregard i t Do not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make any 
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view locations involved in the case, or 
inspect any things or aiticles not produced in court. Do not look things up on the internet. Do not 
look for information in books, dictionaries or public or private records that are not produced in 
court. Do not let anyone else do any of these things for you. . .. 
Do not consider anything that you may have heard or read about, this case in the media or 
by word of mouth or other out-of-court communication. 
The lawyers might stipulate to a fact or I might take judicial notice of a fact. Otherwise, 
what I say and what the lawyers say usually are not evidence. 
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. You are to consider only the evidence in the case; but you are not expected to abandon,;.,. •.- ;.-
your common sense. You are permitted to interpret the evidence in light of your-experience.. 
13. DIRECT -AND CIRGUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 'evidence • •;•-. \-
consists of facts or circumstances that allow someone to.reasonably infer the truth of the. facts to. • • 
be proved; For example,-if the fact to he-proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry-pie, and a •-...•••. • 
•witness testifies-that-she saw lohnnytake a bite of the cherry pie, that is direct evidence of the.. ••/••' *. -
fact. If.the witness testifesthatshe saw Jolirmy with Cherries smeared on his face and.an.empty •-..-
• pie plate inhis-hand,. that is .circumstantial evidence of the fact: ••• ... 
14. . BELIEVABILITY-OFWITNESSES-..• . - -.v .^,'•'.•-;•' 
Testimony in this case will be-given under oath. You must evaluate thebelievability of ••  ../',• 
that testimony. You may believe all or any part of the testimony of a witness. Youmay .also . . • . 
believe one witness- against many witnesses- or. many against one, in accordance with your honest 
convictions. In evaluating the testimony of a witness, youmay want to consider the following: 
(1) Personal interest Do you. believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected one way 
.or the other by any personal interest the witness has in' the case? 
(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by any bias or 
prejudice? 
(3) Demeanor, Is there anything about the witness's appearance, conduct, ox actions that 
causes you to give more or less weight to the testimony? 
(4) Consistency. How does that testimony tend to support or not support other believable 
evidence that is offered in the case? 
(5) Knowledge. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know what he or she is 
testifying about? 
(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable? 
(7) Reasonableness. Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light of human 
experience? 
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate testimony. You are the • 
ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability. 
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15.- INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS • 
You may believe that a witness, on another .occasion, made a statement inconsistent with . 
•that witness's.testimony given here. That doesn't mean thatyou are required-to disreganLthe:,•...-. 
testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe the witness. • » ; • . 
•16. EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY :-.-.?:,. -
• If .you believe any witness has intentionally testified, falsely about any important -matter,. 
you. may disregard the.entire-testimony of that witness, or you may disregard only, intentionally • 
false testimony. • . ' ; • • . : . 
17. STIPULATIONS 
• A stipulation-is an agreement. Unless I instruct you otherwise, when the lawyers .on both 
sides stipulate or. agree to a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that.fact 
as proved. The parties have stipulated to the following facts: 
a) The legal description of the property subject to this litigation; 
b) That the photograph of the subj ect property introduced into evidence by the 
defendants is an. accurate representation of the subject property; and 
c) That the date of valuation is December 30,2002. 
Since the parties have agreed on these facts, you must accept them as true for purposes of 
this case. 
18. OBJECTIONS AND RULINGS ON EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE 
From time to time during the trial, I-may have to make rulings on objections or motions 
made by the lawyers. Lawyers on each side of a case have a right to object when the other side 
offers evidence that the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not think less of a lawyer 
or a party because the lawyer makes objections. You should not conclude from any ruling or 
comment that I make that I have any opinion about the merits of the case or that I favor one side 
or the other. And if I sustain an objection to a question, you should not draw any conclusions 
from the question itself. 
During the trial I may have to confer with the lawyers out of your hearing about questions 
of law or procedure. Sometimes: you may be excused from the courtroom for that same reason. I 
will try to limit these interruptions as much as possible, but you should remember the importance 
of the matter you are here to decide. Please be patient even though the case may seem to go 
slowly. 
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-1:9. • • STATEMENT OF OPINION . 
Under-limited -circumstances, 1 will allow.a witness.-to express.-an opinion, You--do .not..: 
. liave.to. believe an opinion, whether orrnot it .comes .feom;m;expert witoess^Gonsider-opinion,. . 
. • testimony as you wpuld any- other evidence, and-give it the weight you think it .deserves. • •...-. 
•:20, . EXPERT. WITNESS, . .--V:- — - . .-.•.: • 
• •.•••. The-rules.of evidence-ordinarily do. not permit .the. opinions,of a.witness to.'be.recei^edas 
. evidence. An' exception to this rule-exists:in .the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who;:hy,-.v,;-- •: 
education, study and experience, havebecome expert-in some art, science, profession or. callings-
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as ..an expert, .-so/long • 
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such ..expert opinion and: the ,-.• 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it 
deserves. If you should decide* that the opinions of-an. expert, witness are not based upon- • 
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons'given-in--support.;-
of the opinions are.not.sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other-evidence, you may . 
disregard the opinion entirely. 
2 1 . ' CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of. J. Philip Cook and Jack Brown 
and Gary Free, you may compare and weight the opinion of one against that .of another. In doing 
this, you may consider the qualifications and credibility of each, as well as the reasons of each 
opinion and the facts on which the opinions are based.- , 
[OPENINGSTATEMENTS.BY COUNSEL]] 
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED] 
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22. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages, which 
contain instructions relating to the procedure that you should follow and the particular laws or .-
rales that apply in this case. These additional instructions begin with instruction number'twenty-
two (22), .We-will now. read those instructions. .-
23. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss;. 
this case: 
a. All exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. Your notes (if any); 
c. Your copy of these instructions; and 
d. The verdict form or forms. 
24. NOTES 
The use of notes in the jury, room to refresh your memory is perfectly acceptable. But let 
.me caution you not to rely excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a verdict 
independently after consultation with the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own 
memory of the evidence. One juror's opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely 
because that juror has taken notes. 
25. SELECTION OF JURY FOREPERSON AND DELIBERATION 
When you go into the jury room, your first task is to select a foreperson. The foreperson 
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict form when it's completed. The 
foreperson should not dominate the discussions. The foreperson's opinions should be given the 
same weight as the opinions of the other jurors. 
After you select the foreperson you must discuss with one another - or deliberate - with a 
view to reaching an agreement. Your attitude and conduct during discussions are very important. 
As you begin your discussions, it is not helpful to say that your mind is already made up. 
Do not announce that you are determined to vote a certain way or that your mind cannot be 
changed. Each of you must decide the; case for yourself, but only after discussing the case with 
your fellow jurors. 
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Do not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is wrong. Likewise, you. •• • . 
should not surrender your honest, conviction's just to end the deliberations or to. agr.ee wifh.-.other • • 
jurors. .. • - ' ..-v. -. 
, 26. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION u ..-
:•• • -. -If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to -the 
bailiff I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer )'our question whenever appropriate.-
However; these ihstinictions should- contain all the information you need to r.each-:a verdict based : y:\ 
upon the evidence. ' • • . . . . 
27. FOCUS.ON THIS-CASE-ALONE :.f>r--, •;,.'. : /- , 
Your duty is to decide this case and this, case alone. You should not use this case as a 
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other eases, or BIS a means of expressingindividual or '•-.••• 
• collective views- about anything other than the issues you are called upon- to decide.; .Your, verdict 
should reflect the facts .as found by you applied to the law as explained in these.instructions and 
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives; 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will-
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a • . 
just and proper verdict. 
28. DO NOT SPECULATE OR RESORT TO CHANCE 
When you deliberate, do not flip a coin, speculate or choose one juror's opinions at . 
random. Evaluate the evidence and come to a decision that is supported by the evidence. 
. If you decide that a party is entitled to recover damages, you must then agree upon the 
amount of money to award that party. Each of you should state your own independent judgment 
on what the amount should be. You must thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, evaluate 
them according to these instructions and the evidence, and reach an agreement on the amount. 
You must not agree in advance to average the estimates. 
29.. AGREEMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
I am going to give you a form called the Special Verdict that contains a single question. 
You must answer the question based upon the evidence you have seen and heard during this trial. 
Because this is not a criminal case, your verdict does not have to be unanimous. At least 
six jurors must agree on the answer to the question. 
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to the question, the foreperson should 
sign and date the verdict form and tell the bailiff you have finished. The bailiff will escort you 
back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed Special Verdict with you. 
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30. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the court, I, or the cleric, may ask each of you about -
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you v/ill be excused from the jury box and you may leave 
«at any time.: You'may remain in the cdnrtroomdf you-wish to watch the rest of the proceedings, . 
which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not 
required to talk-about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you.about the case when you don't want to 
do that, please tell the court clerk or bailiff. " . . . 
• 31. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS' 
This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the State of Utah for 
the purpose of condemning and acquiring private property of the defendant landowners for a , 
public purpose. The party commencing this action, known as the plaintiff, is the Utah •. 
Department of Transportation, and the property .owners-,,-known as the defendants, are James 
Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in this case include the value of 
the loss of view from the defendants' property. 
32. OWNER TESTIFYING 
Thedefendants have rendered an opinion as to the value of loss of view from their 
property. In considering the weight to be given to the defendants' testimony on the value of the 
loss of view from their property, you may consider the defendants' bias and personal 
involvement, the defendants7 specific Icnowledge of the property, and the defendants5 experience 
and qualifications to testify regarding land, value,-
33. TAKING 
In. this case, the condemnation or "talcing" involves a parcel of land which was 
condemned as an essential component for the plaintiff s project to expand and elevate U.S. 
Highway 89 over Shepard Lane hi Farmington, Utah. 
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public highway, and a 
reasonable right to receive air and light from an adjacent public highway and a view from their 
property. 
If you find that the fan market value of the remaining property is less in the "after 
condition" than the "before condition" because of a loss of view, then you may award damages 
based on the reduced value of the remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain 
and not contingent, remote or speculative. 
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A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be seen by passing traffic 
and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing' 
traffic. 
34. LOSS OF VIEW ' 
In this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a legal right to 
recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss .of view is to be measured by the sSert 
the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the market^M^ 
35.. DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY PERMA1NENT INJTJRY 
The measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the difference in the fair market 
value of the land immediately before and after the injury. This is called "diminution in value.'5 
36. . FAIR MARKET VALUE . 
Fair market value is the highest probable price estimated in terms of money that land 
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with a reasonable time allowed in which to 
find a buyer with knowledge of .all the uses and purposes'to which the land was adapted... 
• In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willing buyer would have paid a 
willing seller in an aims-length transaction with both parties being fully rafoimed concerning all .' 
of the advantages and disadvantages to the property, and with neither acting under any . 
compulsion to buy or sell. . 
ha this case you are to determine the fair market value of the loss of view from the 
defendants' property. 
37. BURDEN OF PROOF 
The defendants have the burden of proving the amount of damages for diminution in 
value of the subject property. 
38. COMPARABLE SALES 
Some of the witnesses have testified about sales of property similar to the property 
involved in this case. You may consider the price voluntarily paid for similar property under 
similar circumstances in helping you determine the value of the loss of view from the defendants' 
property in this case. Comparable sales are factors to be considered but are not the sole basis in 
determining fair market value of the property in dispute. 
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39. JUST COMPENSATION 
The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants' property because of public 
necessity. In tins case, just compensation must be paid for the value of the loss of view from the 
defendants' property. Just compensation includes the fair market value'of the loss of view from 
the defendants'property. 
40. COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES 
In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid to the defendants 
in the following manner: You will decide the value of the loss of view from the defendants5 
property by detennining the fair market value as of December 30, 2002. 
41. INTEREST 
You are not to consider interest in assessing the value of the defendants' property, nor add 
it to the compensation you award. I will compute and add such interest to the compensation 
assessed by you. You are not to consider any costs of these proceedings since any such costs will 
be dealt with by me in accordance with the law. 
42. LOSS OF PROFITS 
In arriving at your detennination of fair market value of-the subject property, you shall 
not consider alleged injury to any business or business operation conducted on or about the 
dependants' property as of the date of condemnation as a separate element of recoverable 
damages. Nor should you consider any claim for loss of profit or income from any business 
operation caused by the condemnation of the land and improvements for the public use as a 
separate element of recoverable damages. The plaintiff in this action must pay to the defendant 
the fair market value of the property being acquired, which has occurred but for the defendants' 
loss of view from the property. Such factors as claimed damage to business operations or loss of 
profits are not recoverable, but may be considered as bearing upon estabhshing the market value 
of the subject property. 
43. HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
The defendants are entitled to just compensation based upon the highest and best use for 
which the property was reasonably adapted on the date of talcing, without limitation to the use 
that was actually made of the property. The -highest and best use means its most advantageous 
and valuable use, having due regard to the existing conditions and reasonable needs or wants of 
the community, including such needs or wants as may probably be expected in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. The tenn "probably" means that the property would more likely than not be 
put to a particular use except for the taking. 
An owner may show present or future uses which are sufficiently practicable and 
probable as to likely influence the price which an informed purchaser would have given for the 
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:
-property at the time of the taking. The uses which may be considered must be .so. reasonably. .:,.• -...:.;: -
probable as to have an. effect on the fair market value of the land at the time, of taking.- A purely •. .-•;. -• •,-, / 
.imaginative-or. speculative'.use-.cannotbe: ;considered. •• ..,.-..- • '..• ..-,:.• :.•-.,.-v / :..-..: •-.;...;-...-.•.-,;.:••. 
..In-detennining highest-and best use^you-maytake into consideration: (1) the actual, use. of••:•":• ••.>•:• .-••;. 
the. property at the date fixed for evaluation; (2) its location; "(3) its topography;-. (4) the use of the' "••.-. 
•.surrounding properties, both past and present; (5) the zoningof the property at the time in. •. '. 
-.question^ or the1 lack thereof; (6) the availability;of water and utility facihties.as-.ofthat time;-(7) •.-• 
market conditions in the general vicinity; (8) the supply and demand for comparable property.-in, .;... ../.,-: "• 
the general area; and (9).-. any other factors which you believe the-informed and willing .buyer aiidv./ ;vvv.;;.-..v 
seller would take into account in fixing the probable use-.of the subject property, as of December •'•...: 
3:0,2002, of- within- the reasonably foreseeable future. . • •• . . . .-v.. .. •• -.•*,.•:•., •„...•• ,,•-.... .' 
44. ACCESS • 
.. You.areinstractedihat the use of .the highways andsfreetsmaybelirnited, controlledand.-.. 
regulated by the exercise of the police power .to the extent necessary to promote, the health, safety 
and welfare of the public. However, the right to enter .and. leave a person's land-cannot be entirely 
cut off..Free and convenient access shall be provided to an owner who had free and convenient • 
access prior .to the enactment of the regulation. 
;45. '.SPECULATIVE COMPENSATION • 
In determining just compensation, you are not to take into consideration imaginative or. 
speculative values or damages. You are.not to consider, the price for which the property would-. 
sell under special or extraordinary .circumstances, but only such values that axe real and supported 
by the evidence. 
46. VIEWING OF PROPERTY 
You may use any information or knowledge obtained by you while viewing the property 
in this case only for the purpose of determining the weight and applicability of the testimony and 
evidence introduced in this trial. 
Your view of the property is not evidence, in and of itself, upon which a verdict may be 
based. You may use it- only to aid you in better understanding the testimony of the witnesses. 
47. SYMPATHY OR ANIMOSITY NOT TO BE CONSIDERED 
The plaintiff has a legal right to condemn land under appropriate circumstances for the 
purpose of constructing public projects. You shall not assess compensation in favor of the 
defendant solely because the land may have been taken against the defendants' will. Rather, your 
verdict shall be limited to the fair market value of the loss of view from the defendants5 property. 
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. 48.. SETTLEMENT OF VALUE OF PROPERTY • 
.Theparties- have already reached agreement on the fair market value of the property taken 
for the highway construction. The landowner has already been folly paid this value. . 
• • The .purpose of this trial is to determine if the landowner is. to receive any additional. 
compensation for the value, of the loss of view from their property. You are to. determine that. 
dollar value, if any.-• * . • - • . . . ,> . . 
•49..- ARGUMENTS .OF COUNSEL NOT EYIDENCE OF DAMAGES . ..;-:...,.-,, -
. You-.may consider the arguments of the attorneys to assist you in deciding the .amounts, of 
damages, but their arguments are not evidence. 
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Donald J. Winder #3519 • 
John W.Holt #5.720 
WINDER. & COUNSEL, P.C. 
175 West 200 South #4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for D efendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
m AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF . 
•TRANSPORTATION, 
•Plaintiff,-
:
 vs. 
JAWESrVERS;XATEDBRINBaHA.VAS, • 
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant) 
_ Defendants. | 
. "MEMORANDUM ESTSUPPORT OF . 
' DEFENDANT'SMOTIONMLMTNEAND 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF J. 
PHILLIP. COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT • 
Civil No. 020700665 
Judge Michael Allphin 
Defendants (collectively referred to herein as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, hereby 
respectfully submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants7 Motion in Limine and Motion 
to Strike Portions of J, Phillip Cook's Appraisal, 
INTRODUCTION 
Arby's has sustained severance damages as a result of Plaintiffs ("UDOT") construction 
project to elevate U*S, 89 over Shepard Lane in Faxmington, Utah. After a lengthy appeals 
process, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled Arby's is entitled present evidence to a jury to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
support the severance damages claim. UDOThas attempted through various motions to preclude 
Arby's from recovering damages and has now produced an appraisal from J. Phillip Cook (the 
"Cook Appraisal"), where Cook opines Defendants have suffered absolutely no damages 
resulting from loss of view. Cook's opinion is based upon irrelevant hearsay and opinions from 
lay-witnesses not qualified as experts. Additionally, Cook has failed to show the information he 
obtained from, lay witnesses is of the type reasonably relied upon by real estate appraisers to 
form their conclusions. Further, the facts and data upon which Cook relies for his opinions have 
not been disclosed to Arby's; Relevant portions of the Cook Appraisal, entitled "Market 
"Participant Interviews/5 pp. 51-55, are attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Cook..should.not be' 
permitted to testify at trial concerning opinions based upon hearsay and lay opinions. He should 
also be excluded from testifying based upon irrelevant data. 
•. .ARGUMENT 
" " POINT l ' 
• COOIC RELIES UPON INADMISSASLE HEARSAY 
Cook's Appraisal concludes Arby's loss of view has not negatively impacted the value of 
the subject real property. This opinion is based upon opinions from lay witnesses Cook or his 
assistants allegedly interviewed. Exhibit "A."- This is problematic for numerous reasons. First, 
the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court statements 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted Rule 801(c), UTAH R. BviD. Hearsay is generally 
2 
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inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. EviD,, Cook's interviews of lay witnesses do not meet any 
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 803, UTAHR, EVE>. l 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness based his 
opinion in part on out of court statements, Ci:[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked 
in the form of an expert opinion, would have been impemiissible and potentially highly 
prejudicial." .Edwards v. Didericlcsen>597 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay evidence 
is clearly not admissible at trial • ' " / . . ' 
• • ' " - ' '
 ;: POINT2' •", . . ' 
LAY WXTiqESSES.ARE,NOT QUALIFIED AS EXPERTS 
• While some .of Cook's interviewees are named, many, of 'them are not identified and are 
.only referenced vaguely and generally For example/ on page:5I, Cook .says -he spolce -with- 'the 
managers .of several fast-food restaurants,...3' Exhibit "A". OIL page 52, he states: ccWe also 
interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site selection 
criteria and view out." Id. Cook identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but 
does not identify any of the other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he 
allegedly spolce. 
Moreover, insufficient infonnation is provided concerning the background and 
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value of the 
1
 The interview material is hearsay upon hearsay to the extent Cook relied upon other parties to 
conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into Hs Appraisal. It 
is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along statements they allegedly 
heard from others, 
3 
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subject real property. What are their job duties .and backgrounds? Is the valuation of loss of 
view any part of their job duties? These individuals are apparently involved in managing 
restaurants, but they, are not real estate experts. For example, alleged statements of an individual 
named Treesa Kurtzenbora about the subject property is used to support Cook's opinion that 
Arby's suffered no damage. No information is given concerning Ms. Kurtzenbom's expertise or 
familiarity with the subject property, yet .she freely speculates and opines that other factors 
impacted the value of the subject property more than the view, obstruction. There is no 
foundation for such-a speculative opinion from.a.lay witness and.no explanation for why Cook 
would incorporate such'a statement .from a lay witness into his own expert analysis. This Court 
must insure that an expert witness is .'truly testifying as an expert and not merely serving as a 
conduit through which-inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United States v. Cormier, 
468 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2006) ("an expert witness .may not simply summarize the out-of-court 
statements of others as his testimony") (citation omitted). . 
It is clear the lay witnesses Cook interviewed were .asked to render opinions based upon 
scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. Rule 702, UTAHR, EVID. reserves such testimony 
to experts who have the requisite 'laiowledge, skill., experience, training or education." Id. 
None of Cook's interviewees has been designated a witness in this matter, expert or otherwise. 
Lay witness opinions are limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R. BVID., to the witness's own 
perception, rather than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of 
Cook's interviewees goes well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
4 
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Defendants .have not been able to conduct discovery or cross-examine the individuals 
Cook interviewed in order to test their evidence. Defendants .should be given the opportunity to 
.draw out anything which would tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the lay witaess 
opinions, It would be blatantly prejudicial to simply pennit Cook to pass this untested -and 
unchallenged information on to the jury. 
POINT'S 
THE LAY OPTIONS OT^^ . 
• There are. serious .problems with the relevance.of Cook's interview .data. As.an example, 
Cook apparently interviewed an .assistant store manager of .the Smith's store and representatives 
of a Burger King- on the east side .of U.S. 89, across -from the -subject Arby's location,' These 
locations aremore .distant from the-elevated U.S.-89than the Arby's property. The Smith5 s;store 
is further north than the Arby's property and. does not face the highest point of the elevated U.S. 
89. Additionally, Cook fails to explain how the lack of customer complaints2 about loss of view 
at a grocery .store (or other unrelated locations) has any bearing on detennimng the loss in the 
fair market value of the subject property. The Cook Appraisal is replete with this land of 
irrelevant material. 
2
 Cook relies upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations other than 
subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage for loss of view. 
Eyen if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any relevance in this matter, 
Cook has laid no foundation to show that the persons interviewed would have been the persons 
to whom customers would have complained. 
5 
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POINT 4 
• THE MATERIAL COOK RELIES UPON IS NOT OF THE TYPE AN APPRAISER 
REASONABLY BASES OPINIONS 
. Rule 703, UTAH R. EVID. states the data upon; which an-expert bases his opinion need not 
be admissible ia evidence if the data is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions....'5 Cook fails to explain that opinions of lay witnesses, 
particulafly those who have no faxniharity with the subject-property, are the type of facts or data 
upon which a licensed-real, estate appraiser would reasonably rely to. value property. The 
material, which is not admissible due to the problems discussed above, is not of the type upon 
which an appraiser relies to appraise'real property. Cook's opinions should be/based upon the 
standard of Rule 702, UTAH R. EviD., rather., than memorialize impermissible lay opinions. ' 
Therefore, it should be rejected, and to. the extent Cook has relied upon that information, he 
should be excluded from discussing it at trial. 
• .POINT 5 . 
COOK'S UNDERLYING METHODOLOGY HAS NOT BEEN DISCLOSED . 
Not only does Cook fail to provide any foundation concerning the quahficationsof the 
interviewees to render opinions, but he provides no information about the methodology of the 
interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified? How were the interviews 
conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to the subject property with respect to 
the view issue? What questions were asked? What is the identity of persons interviewed who 
are not discussed in the Cook Appraisal? What individuals ;were mterviewed who are not 
6 
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mentioned in the report? What information was obtained through the interview process that 
contradicts Cook's opinions? What documentation or recordings exist of the interviews? 
Defendants have legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what is referenced in 
the Cook Appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of those who were 
interviewed. At amhimum, pursuant to Rule 705, UTAHR. BVID., if for some reason the Court 
permits Cook to rely upon this data,-all of the facte and data underlying Cook's opinions should 
be disclosed to Arby's prior to trial. ' . ' 
• ,.;' . . / : • ' • : ' • , .. POINTf • • .. 
With the concerns referenced above?, Cook's opinion does not meet the standards required 
under Rule 702. That Rule, in relevant part, provides:'f • " . ' " . , 
(b) Scientific, technical or olherwise specialized knowledge may 
serve as the basis for .expert testimony if the scientific/technical? of 
other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a 
threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data," and (iii) have been reliably applied to the 
facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is 
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is 
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of 
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by 
the relevant expert community. 
As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UTAH R BVE>, is 
to be applied to "all .expert testimony." The Note continues by explaining that, just, as in federal 
court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper* responsibility to screen out unreliable 
7 
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expert testimony." To Mfill this role, the -Note advises that the trial judge should "confront 
proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should be "receptive to any plausible 
evidence that may bear on reliability." , 
Because Cook relies upon irrelevant hearsay "opinions from lay witnesses, his opinions 
are unreliable. Defendants • submit the Court, acting as gatekeeper, should exclude .such 
testimony and evidence at .'trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, portions of: J. Phillip Cook's Appraisal .should be stricken and he 
should not be permitted to express his opinions at trial based upon irrelevant hearsay and lay 
oproion. ft 
DATED this /AO day'of March, 2010 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
paid J. Winder 
Holm W. Holt 
OTOxneys for Defendants 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U A 9? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
n 
H PROPERTY.OWNED BY JAMES IVERS 
(ARBY'S RESTAURANT) 
Parcel Number 2(59 
Project No. STP-0067(1)0 
n 
Located at 
±1253 North Highway 89 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah. 
i 
f ; 
, f 
PREPARED FOR: 
.STATE OP UTAH " : 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
c/o Mr. Randy Hunter • 
160 Eas£300South, Fifth Floor 
• Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Submitted by: 
J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE 
Director, and 
Richard Sjoan, App.rais.er 
LECC, LLC 
201 South Main Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILE NUMBER: 10-03-01SL 
CASE NUMBER: jiver-25561 
EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL DATE: 
December 30,2002 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1
' LCCG 
n • 
March 3, 2010 
Mr. Randy Hunter • 
Assistant Attorney General 
State .of Utah • 
160 East 300 South, 5*1 Floor ' •. -: . . . • •... , 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 • 
Re: Appraisal: A partial taking-of the view out property right appurtenant to land owned 
by James ivers, et .aL (Arby's Restaurant), located' at ±1253 North Highway 89, 
Farrnington, Davis County, Utah. Parcel No, 269 of Project No. STP-0O67(1)O. 
Dear Mr. Hunter: • 
As you know, on September 4, 2Q03,«we provided an appraisal addressing market value of." 
the taking .of land and. site;.'improvements from the. above-referenced property. That 
'appraisal, which addressed the value aftfta propentytaken, .severance da.iria.ges and'benefits, 
was the basis for-negotiations that resulted in settling'the majority :of issues regarding the 
property owner's claim for compensation/./Specifically, the parties have reached-settlement 
on the value of the property .actually taken and claimed severance damages .relating "to the 
taking of landscapingthat'ieft the property non-conforming relative to zoning. 
The Court has 'heard and ruled on the owner's claim that lost visibility/exposure and reduced 
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the property. The Court ruled that 
property owners have .no appurtenant rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have 
appurtenant rights only to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access in 
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the -owner's claim that 
lost--view -out reduced value, of the property. Its conclusion was that view, from a. property 
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's 
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto 
must be addressed. • 
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the 
reduced view to the east clue to UDOT'S elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It 
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has 
been paid. 
201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84171 
main 801.364.6233 fax 801.364-6230 www.iecg.carn 
n 
n 
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Page Two 
As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of t h e data, reasoning, 
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process t o develop an opinion of value. The 
depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the 
intended use stated within this report. . 
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice (USPAP) as.promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation. 
The valuation date is December 30, 2002, which is the date of Service of .Summons. 'After 
careful consideration, and analysis of available information., -we are of the opinion that market 
value of the subject is not negatively affected by the reduced view o u t Therefore, no 
compensation 'beyond that already paid for the taking and claimed severance damages for 
lost landscaping is concluded, . 
This conclusion is subject to assumptions and limiting conditions contained in the report. 
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish its intended function. Please call if we can be. of 
• further.assistance. :•."• '. •[ ", .."•';. 
Respectfully submitted, • 
[J. Philip Cook, MAJ-CRE 
LECG, LLC, Director 
Utah State - -Certified General Appraiser . 
Certificate 5451057-CGOO Expires 06-30-11 
J4^*^C C 4 ^ ^ -
i Richard C. Sloan 
1ECG, LLC,.Appraiser 
Utah.State.- Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 57Q7759-CG00 Expires 11 -3.0-11 
201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake Gfy, VT mill 
main 801364.6233 fax 801.364.6230 www.lecg.com 
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LECG CERTIFICATION 
CERTIFICATION. 
We certify that we have made an investigation and analysis of the following property: 
Property Owned by James ivers, et al. 
{Arby's Restaurant) 
Located at .±1253 North-Highway 89 • 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah 
Davis County Assessor's Parcel No. 08-051 -0097 
We certify that to the best of our knowledge and belief: 
1. 
5, 
6/ 
7. 
9.. 
10. 
I V 
T2. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16, 
The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct 
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited-only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our 
personal, impartial/and unbiased .professional analyses, opinions, and conclusions, 
*We. have no presentor prospective interest in the. property that Is the subject of this report and we have no. persona! interest with 
.respectto thepartieslnvolyed. ... "•• .• .
 t • ' ' . • • • • 
We'have no present or prospective interest in the property that Is the subject of this report and nD personal interest with respect to. 
the parties involved- ' 
' We have no'bias with respect to-the property that is the subject of.this report or to the parties involved .with this assignment 
Our engagement in' this assignment was not contingent upon devebping;or reporting predetermined results. 
Our compensation, for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of.a predetermined value' or 
direction in value thatfavars the cause of the.client, the amount of the value opinion, the attainment of .a stipulated result, or the 
occurrence of.aisubsequent event directly related to the Intended use of.this appraisal. . 
The reported-analyses, opinions, and .conclusions -were -developed, and '.this report has been prepared -in conformity with the 
••requirements of the "Code of-Professional .-Ethics.& Standards .of Professional .Appraisal Practice of the Appraisal institute; which 
•include ihelf/rfform Standards- of Professional Appraisal Practice. ' . 
'We:have made an Inspection of "the property that'is'the subject of. this.report 
No one .provided professional.assistance in preparing this report' 
j . Philip Cook has- completed the requirements of the continuing- education program of the Appraisal institute.--
The value .conclusion as well as other opinions- expressed herein are not based on a requested minimum valuation, a specific 
valuation, or the.approval of a ban. 
Our state appraisal certifications have not been -revoked, suspended, canceled, or restricted. 
The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and -experience to complete the assignment in a 
competent manner. The reader is referred to the appraisers' Statement of Qualifications. : 
J. Philip Cook is currently a'Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451Q57-CG0Q. 
Richard C Sloan is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #57D7759-CGQD 
Dated: March 3, 2010 
, Philip Cook, MAI CRE 
ILECG, LLC, Director 
HJtah State - Certified General Appraiser 
(Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11 
I iu4wt^ (L ^ O T ^ ^ 
Richard C. Sloan 
LECG, LLC, Appraiser 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5707759-CGOO Expires 11-30-11 
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LECG SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
Market Participant Interviews 
We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug and the owner of 
Burger King, which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the subject 
Similar to the subject; both Smith's and Burger King have restricted views west due to the 
Highway 89 overpass, although both are more distant from the overpass than the subject. 
.Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the. lack of view out of the store-
was not an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view. 
He said that business had increased 20 percent over the past year and .25 percent .or more 
over the past two yeans. ' • • . ' . ' : ' " 
Joshua Harrison of Blue Mountain Restaurants, who owns the Burger King store said that he ' 
and his partner, Tom Long, purchased the store in 2004, after the construction of the. . 
overpass. He said that the view of the. overpass from the restaurant-had no bearing on the 
purchase • of the property .including the purchase price, -nor did the newly .constructed 
overpass have any impact in general. ' ./ 
Adam Hawkes with NAf Utah in Layton, who is assisting in redevelopment of the 
nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west of the subject, said that no one cares 
what they are looking atonce they get inside the -building. Likewise, Nick Mason with CB , 
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what property users want is .exposure. 
Mason., is currently listing a-pad-site-for.saieJocated .near.the- SBO-North/M 5 interchange, in.. . 
Clearfield. The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp with 1-75 raised up just to the east to 
cross over 680 North. Mason said that irregular shape of the parcel affected the asking price, 
but no consideration was given for the obstructed view out to the east by the freeway. 
We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of 
Carl's Jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's jr., Taco Bell and Arby's in Centervr/Je, 
and KFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street. All of these fast-food restaurants abut a • 
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LECG SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
freeway overpass or raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the 
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a 
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business. 
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the 
restaurant faces east with the raised freeway located across the street to the east The 
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as it was across the 
street She also said that customers could seethe mountains to the .east over the overpass. 
The regional manager for Arby' at this store, Matthew Martin, said that traffic and exposure' 
were the important'issues, Martin said that-once 'the customers were inside the store it 
didn't ready matter what the view -was. . 
The layout .of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was constructed around'1993, is 
similar-to the layout of the subject. 'Joe -Rich, the property's developer with Woodbury -
•Corporation, said he does.not remember view out being discussed in any way. He said that 
'Woodburywonld' not have-reduced the price -because of the obstructed view. 
The .property owner of the Clearfield-Arby's,. Tneesa Kurtzeborn, .said that the raised-freeway 
was hot a factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both 
.a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure "and proximity to an-off-ramp 
as positives. She did not mention what the negatives-were but said that the raised freeway 
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurfzeborn said that in purchasing the 
.propentyL,she.loolced mote, atiwhat £b.e .surroundjngiievejqpinent was..aad.th.e;typ.e..of..draw. , 
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart 
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a 
major draw to the center. 
Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north, 
purchased the subject in October 2009, According to Mr. Burt, his store has not been 
affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once 
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'LECG SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
customers figured out how to use the interchange upon completion of construction, his 
business quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically 
• not view out Mr. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's'restaurant with the intent of 
expanding his store upon termination of the lease in 2017. 
We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site 
' selection criteria and view out Russ Smith, the site selection manager for Wendy's, said that 
view is a plus, but the view must be ready bad before it becomes a negative,, such as looking 
at a. garbage dump. With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view .is 
neutral Smith said that the primary concerns are access -and exposure, with demographics, 
also playing a role, and he would have no .problem siting a.restaurant pear an overpass as it 
.may mean better exposure. He noted that the view out from the Wendy's, restaurant in 
Centerville is of a gas station to the north and other .retail development to the west and east 
Smith also .said that view-out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons 
aresMingforahhourormore, . • , . • ' • . ' . . • ' . ' • . . ' . 
Lisa Shaw, the western region site selection manager, with Carl's Jr., .said that view out is not 
an issue as long as it is not bad, such as an adult entertainment establishment Shaw said .. 
that the main criteria considered in site selection relates to lot size, demographics, price, 
access, and visibility. She said that she tries to .site the restaurants by other retailers or 
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she 
can ..get people in. the door, jt .really ^ dpesn^ t matter whatthey.wew w store., ijrthe.. _ 
case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most, Shaw 
referenced a store in New Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it. 
Although access was unchanged, it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road 
hurt the business. 
We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection manager for 
Arby's restaurants, and were provided with the Arby's site selection criteria (previously 
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LECG SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was 
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass 
of surrounding development, and'tries to negotiate reciprocal parking. 
With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albeit very minor. He said there are 
many locations that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the 
view* According to Langran, customers are not interested-in what they are looking-at out the 
window. He said while .a view of the mountains may be-nice, it is not critical 
In addition, Langran said that loss of exposure .affects the impulse buyer which* is roughly 20 
percent of the business. ..He said that office-or residential customers that-are either return or. 
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located 
and'know the back way into the.property,. ;• ... •• • 
•For additional .support, photographs of various .properties' with .obstructed • views .in one or • 
two directions, some of which were '.'previously discussed, are presented in .the addenda. 
.The -majority of thds'e properties-were tbuilt-.with the view obstruction already in place,.and 
there is no evidence any of the properties' values were .affected by the impaired view out 
Conclusion 
The' paired data analysis'is quite"conclusive' that' retail prope'rly,'values*are*not, impacted ""*' 
negatively by the loss of view out This is also the overriding consensus among real estate 
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food 
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's 
value. 
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T hereby certify that on this J/V day of March, 2010,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
MEMORANDUM IN.SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE PORTIONS OF J. PHILLIP COOK'S.APPRAISAL REPORT to be emailed and 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randy Hunter 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor • • . • • ' • . 
..E.O. Box 140874 . . • " • • . . . ' • ' • . . 
' • " .SaHLakeCity,Utah 84114^ .0874 " • . " . ' , ' ' 
randyhunter@utah.gov 
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A. 
Q. 
1 You've 
little 
A. 
-18-
the bridge? 
Yes. 
Okay, let's look at slide.30, showing the distances. 
indicated'that the distances, on the average, are a 
bit shy of 200 feet? 
Yeah, 192 is what we measure- from the store, itself, 
to the wall. It's about ''65 feet from the prcper/ty line to the 
wall. 
Q. • Okay". Is it reasonable to review —- to refer to this 
as a. "partial view impairment"?. 
A- • .Certainly it/s onlya partial view impairment.. 
•There's no ~ • • . . 
Q. There's.not a total, view impairment? 
A. —there's no"material view impairment in most 
directions, b-ut to the east there is a partial view impairment. 
Q. Is view an important.amenity for real estate? • 
A. . It.can be. 
Q. What type of real estate is view important to? 
A. Resort hotels overlooking the ocean, a view would be 
very important. High end homes in resort settings, a view is 
an amenity for which buyers will pay a premium. 
Q. How about industrial properties? 
A. Industrial properties are not bought for view out. 
Most industrial buildings don't have windows. They're --
they may have a few windows in the office area, but industrial 
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1 buildings are typically designed for either storage where 
2 they're stacking inventory along the outside walls, as well 
3 as throughout the center of the building, and so they don't 
4 have windows; or it's manufacturing, where they don't want 
5 employees to be looking out the window while they' re -- while 
6 they're working, for safety purposes. 
7 Q. How about the view in, visibility/ is that important 
8 to an industrial property? 
9 A. It can be. 
10 Q. Why is that? 
11 -A. Well, some industrial businesses are ~- they'll have 
12 a what we call -a ushowroom warehouse." So like a lot of home 
13 construction materials companies like tile companies will 
14 like to advertise and get people into their showroom. They 
15 are actually selling wholesale to the contractors, but the 
16 homeowner's picking out the goods. So if they can be exposed 
17 to, say, a freeway or something, and have that visibility, that 
18 can help their business. 
19 Q. Is it customary for them to put some — their name or 
20 some advertising on the outside of the building? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Does that contribute — that visibility contribute to 
23 an industrial property? 
2 4 A. An industrial user that is worried about -- or is 
25 hopeful to get some recognition from-the marketplace, that's 
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exactly what they want to do. 
Q. It provides some name recognition? 
A.. Right, but there are a lot of industrial users that 
don't care. This is sort of a unique little group of industrial 
users where there's some advantage to that disability. 
'•'Q. So the visibility in is different than the visibility 
out./ is that what you're saying? • .• 
'A. Significantly. . 
Q. Okay, how about fast" food restaurants.;' is. view out an 
important amenity to a fast food restaurant? 
A.. ' It is not. ' It wasn't listed in the .criteria of site 
selection -for fast food operators. It. wasn't, something'that in 
my varied discussions with individuals who are. involved in that 
business identified as' an issue." -I've also studied it with 
specific paired sales suggested is not an amenity that fast 
food restaurants care about. • 
Q. Where are fast food restaurants typically.located? 
A. They are typically located along freeway interchanges 
or in front of shopping centers. Ideally, both. 
Q. Is that for their convenience? 
A. Right, it's for convenience, it's.for visibility, it's 
for accessibility. 
Q. I believe you said fast food restaurants are frequently 
located at highway/freeway intersections. 
A. They are. 
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1 Q. Why is this data collection process so important to an 
2 MAI appraiser? 
3 A. You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but 
4 their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base 
5 their opinion. We have a standards obligation, an ethical 
6 obligation to provide appraisal work in a non ~-
7 Q. Want to pull the microphone back towards --
8 A. — in a non-misleading way, and to prove our -- prove 
9 our opinions. Not just to pull something out of the air, but 
10 to actually prove our opinions. Even though there's a lot of 
11 anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not 
12 something these fast food operators particularly care about, 
13 we need to go to the market to confirm that. 
14 Q. So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in 
15 forming your opinions? 
16 A. Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my 
17 sole reliance. 
18 Q. Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case 
19 studies? 
2 0 A. That I cannot is — I cannot find in the marketplace 
21 where this changed the subject's situation, specifically 
22 related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding 
23 accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which 
24 I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court, 
25 that just this view impairment has no impact on market value. 
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Q. That's the conclusion of your data? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that supported by your other research*? 
A. It is. 
Q. Does it surprise you .that yo,u couldn't .'find any value 
for that view out? 
A. It doesn't.' * 
. Q. Why is that? •'••'.'• 
A. - Because of how common it is in this imperfect worl:d 
'that --'that view impairment, especially .in situations next to' 
the highway, where you're trying to. attract'highway business, 
how. common that is., and'why. a business would locate1 in that-' 
situation i.f i't were —'• if .it were .that critical of a .factor. .  
So. r'm. not" surprised by the results. • ••,. " ••••".' 
•Q. Now, I've aske.d you to look, at a book- by Misters 
Bell and. Oral Anderson, published by the American — or.the 
Appraisal Institute,'titled AVReal.Estate Damages." Have you 
looked at that book? . •' 
A. Yes. 
Q. You're familiar with that book? 
A. I am 
Q. In fact, I had the first edition, and you gave me the 
second edition; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A newer mod -- newer version *of it. Is this approach 
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A. I did. 
Q. You obtained anecdotal evidence --
A. Yes. 
Q. — from market participants; and based upon that 
effort, that research, what was your conclusion? 
A. I couldn't isolate or prove or identify any value, loss 
or value diminution related to this partial view impairment out 
to the east, or this fast food restaurant property. 
MR. HUNTER: Thank you. Your Honor, might I approach 
for a moment? 
THE COURT: Please. 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
Q. BY MR, HUNTER: So just to conclude, .it is your 
professional opinion that the view out from the Arby's 
restaurant has no monetary value? 
A, Correct. 
Q, Thank you. If you can stay, because we're going to 
need to review some of these, if that's okay? 
A. I guess so. 
Q. I don't know how you got that set up. All right, 
thank you. Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WINDER: 
Q. Good morning, Mr. Cook. 
A. Good morning, Mr.' Winder. 
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A. Yes, that's my testimony. 
Q. All right, and -- and it's 20 to 22 feet high? 
A. Yes. 
• ;Q. HOW wide is this? 
A. I don't know. . 
Q. I t ' s q u i t e a d i s t a n c e . ' I t ' s got how many • l anes of 
t r a f f i c in each d i rec t ion .? . 
:• A. . I b e l i e v e i t has two lanes of t r a f f i c in each 
d i r e c t i o n . ' . . .••.• 
Q.. All r i g h t , and how long is , t h i s o b s t r u c t i o n , from 
where to where? .. How long does i t run?-- : 
A. 'How long i s the road, or how.lon.g i s . the — 
Q. E leva ted . How long i s the road as e l e v a t e d here? 
.A. Probably t h r e e - q u a r t e r s a-mi le to the n o r t h and a h a l f 
mi le t o the sou th . Mo, a c t u a l l y i t probably con t inues e l e v a t e d 
even beyond a ha l f mile t o the south . 
Q. Oka-y, now we - - we agree t h a t view i s a component of 
va lue for a t l e a s t some p r o p e r t i e s ? 
A. Yes. • 
Q. All right, and an example would be a res — a single 
family residence in a mountain resort? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It could also be an office building where someone may 
want to look at the Wasatch and pay a little more rent., as 
opposed to looking at a building right next door; could be in 
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that kind of situation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, it could be as individuals. If we wanted 
to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay 
more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the — or the bay 
than something else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. So a buyer, renter or tenant in these 
situations may pay more for a view? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Our disagreement, Mr. Cook, in this case, is with the 
ultimate issue. That is, does the impairment of view thatrs 
been lost by the Arby's operation, did they suffer any damage 
because of it. That's our difference. 
A. Yes, that's why we're here. 
Q, That's why we're here, okay. Now, let's talk about 
some of these — and I'm sorry, I — a copy of the slides that 
I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than 
yours. In purple and at my age, there's -- I'm sorry, there's 
no way I can read that, but if — 
A. If you tell me what it is, then I'll — 
Q. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. So let's --
let's review some of these slides, and talk about them. I'm on 
page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel. My copies are 
teeny, tiny. We had it there, yeah. Good. I can't read the 
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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERTNE G. HAVAS, 
and P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant), 
Defendants/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND FOR REMAND TO 
DISTRICT COURT 
District Court No. 020700665 
Utah Supreme Court No. 20100511 
Appellants James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein 
collectively as "Arby's"), by and through counsel and pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 10(a)(2)(A), 
hereby respectfully move for summary disposition and ask the Court to reverse the Judgment on 
Verdict in the trial court. The basis for this Motion is that the Court has reversed Ivers v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) ("Ivers I"), which was Arby's original 
appeal in this matter. Ivers I was reversed in Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral 
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Beverage Corp., 2011 WL 5110962 (Utah). UDOT petitioned for a rehearing in Admiral 
Beverage, however, that petition was denied on February 22, 2012. 
This present Arby's appeal was stayed by the Court pending this Court's ruling in 
Admiral Beverage. Because Ivers I has been reversed, the Court should proceed to reverse the 
trial court's judgment in this matter, which was based upon the wrongly decided Ivers I opinion, 
and remand the matter to the lower court for further proceedings under the principles of Admiral 
Beverage, 
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum submitted together herewith. 
DATED this ^ V d a y of March, 2012. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
Donald J. Winder 
Jdhn W.Holt 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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DONALD J. WINDER (#3519) 
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WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
460 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2282 
dwinder@winderfirm.com 
iholt@winderfirm.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS, 
and P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant), 
Defendants/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND FOR REMAND TO 
DISTRICT COURT 
District Court No. 020700665 
Utah Supreme Court No. 20100511 
Appellants James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein 
collectively as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, hereby respectfully submit this Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition and for Remand to District Court. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This case was tried in the district court during April 2010, after it was remanded for a 
second time by this Court following its ruling in UDOT v. Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009) 
("Ivers IF). The case was tried based upon the ruling in Ivers v. Utah Department of 
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Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) fivers F\ which precluded Arby's from presenting 
evidence concerning the reduction in fair market value. The confusion and inconsistency created 
by Ivers I was manifest by the fact the jury awarded absolutely no severance damages to Arby's 
despite its clear entitlement to an award of at least some amount of severance damages. 
While the present appeal was pending, the Court requested supplemental briefing in the 
case of Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp, Case No. 20081054, a 
case which sought to reverse Ivers I because of the very problems that resulted in a no cause 
verdict at the trial of this matter. This Court ordered to stay the present appeal pending the 
outcome of Admiral Beverage because of its impact on this ongoing matter. Arby's filed an 
amicus brief in Admiral Beverage. 
On October 18, 2011,, this Court issued its opinion in Admiral Beverage (2011 WL 
5110962 (Utah)), reversing Ivers I Thereafter, UDOT petitioned for a rehearing, but the Court 
denied that petition on February 22, 2012. 
Arby's submits that based upon the reversal of Ivers I in Admiral Beverage, this case 
should now be remanded to the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
Since the Court's October 4, 2012 Order, this appeal has been stayed pending the 
outcome of Admiral Beverage. The purpose of the stay was because the decision in Admiral 
Beverage would have a direct impact on this appeal if Ivers I, the first appeal in this very matter, 
were reversed. Arby's appeals the Judgment and Verdict entered in the district court because 
application of the statement of law in Ivers I resulted in confusing jury instructions about how 
severance damages were to be determined by the jury. Ultimately, Arby's was awarded 
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absolutely no damages despite the fact it was entitled to at least some measure of severance 
damages. See Docketing Statement filed herein, at pp. 2-6. 
In Admiral Beverage, this Court admitted blatantly that "Ivers was wrongly decided." 
Admiral Beverage 2011 WL 5110962*5,1(20, *9, % 35, a,nd *11,f35. The Court determined that 
when evaluating damages, there should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise separate items 
of damage. Id. at *8, ^31. Instead, damage should be "viewed in the composite." Id. This 
attempt to distinguish between loss of view and loss of visibility is what resulted in the 
inconsistent and confusing jury instructions at trial in the lower court. Because of Ivers i, the 
jury wasn't able to merely evaluate the loss of fair market value resulting from the taking, but 
had to attempt to value loss of view from the property in a vacuum. See Brief of Arby's as 
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Admiral Beverage Corporation at pp. 4-11, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Ivers I has been reversed in Admiral Beverage, and this case was stayed because 
of the potential Admiral Beverage would reverse Ivers I, the case should now be remanded to 
district court for further proceedings 
DATED this u K day of March, 2012. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
Dbffald J. Winder 
VJo&n W.Holt 
attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
PlaintiffvAppellee 
vs. 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION 
Defendant/Appellant 
Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC 
•x 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AKD CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
• Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
• Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." (Emphasis added). 
• UTAH CODEANN. §78B-6-511: 
The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered 
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess: 
* * # * * 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which 
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by 
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF .AMICUS CURIAE 
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein 
collectively as "Arby's") are the parties to the very case this Court intends to reconsider, 
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) (referred to herein 
as "Ivers I"). Following the recent trial in the Ivers case, Arby's filed a new appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, Case No. 
20100511-SC. The difficulties in applying Ivers I are what led to the outcome 
1 
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necessitating a new appeal in Ivers. Because the Ivers case has now actually been tried 
under the law set down in Ivers I, Arby's can provide additional insight .and analysis 
concerning why the Ivers /ruling is problematic with respect to the distinction between 
view and visibility in determining severance damages. The Court's decision in the 
present matter is of great interest to Arby's and will have a direct impact on its pending 
appeal. . 
' STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for ..Supplemental Briefing and 
Rehearing in this matter, it appears the issue to be considered is whether the distinction in 
Ivers I between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a property owner's right to 
recover severance damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT 
Arby's is filing this -Amicus Brief in support of Admiral Beverage Corporation's 
position that the distinction between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits, a 
property owner's right to recover just compensation. Arby's does not dispute the 
appropriateness of the causation analysis of Ivers I which adopts the "essential" test. The 
causation analysis does not need to be reconsidered. 
After its long history in the appellate court system, the Ivers case was finally tried 
in Second District Court on April 13-15,2010. Pursuant to this Court's mandate, the sole 
issue to be tried was the amount of severance damages relating to Arby's loss of view. 
The difficulties encountered in applying Ivers I at trial highlights the constitutional 
2 
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problems with the ruling. The parties and the district court attempted to instruct the jury 
based upon their often inconsistent interpretations of Ivers L The process was 
challenging, particularly when attempting to reconcile other well-settled principles of 
condemnation law. 
Additionally, over objection, UDOT's appraiser was permitted to base his 
professional opinion that Arby's had sustained no damage. This opinion is based in part 
on irrelevant and unsupported interviews of lay witnesses, such as managers of unrelated 
fast food restaurants. UDOT's appraiser was also permitted to testify that there is a 
distinction between properties where loss of view is compensable and where it is not 
compensable. In other words, he suggested to the jury that there are property types where 
an owner, such as Arby's, is not entitled to the constitutionaliy protected right of just 
compensation for damage caused to remnant property by an obstruction of view. 
According to this appraiser, compensation for loss of view would be reserved for things 
like high end resort properties with mountain views. 
Although this Court's mandate was for the trial court to determine Arby's 
damages, the jury ultimately awarded no severance damages to Arby's. The jury verdict 
was inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Arby's view had been damaged by UDOT's 
construction project Arby's was denied just compensation under the application of Ivers 
L 
Just compensation in a case involving a claim for severance damages is, and 
should be, based upon the diminution in fair market value of the remnant property. The 
3 
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distinction in Ivers I between view and visibility is confusing, overly complex, aad 
restricts the jury's consideration of factors required to fairly and folly value property and 
award appropriate severance damages. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's distinction 
between view and visibility should be overturned as an unconstitutional limitation on a 
property owner's right to recover severance damages. 
ARGUMENT 
Private property rights are protected by both the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.' Both of these 
documents, which set the very foundations for state and federal law, prohibit the talcing of 
property without just compensation. As thoroughly outlined in Admiral Beverage's 
Supplemental Brief, Utah's Constitution provides even.broader protection than the United 
States Constitution by including language that property will not be damaged for public 
use without just-compensation. 
Utah's condemnation statutes, which must be interpreted and applied consistent 
with the constitutional mandates, provide as follows with respect to severance damages: . 
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence 
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
determine and assess: 
$ £ $ # £ # 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only 
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
the [condemning authority]. (Emphasis added). 
A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-51l. 
Originally, Arby's claim for severance damages included claims that the value of 
its remnant property was damaged by UDOT's taking of a portion of Arby's property 
used to eliminate the traditional intersection at Shepard Lane and U.S. 89 in Farmington, 
Utah. Arby's property is located on the northwest corner of the former intersection at 
Shepard Lane and U.S. 89. Not only was direct access to Arby's remnant property 
eliminated, but, as this Court pointed out in Ivers I, the property's view and visibility 
were blocked by UDOT's elevation of U.S. 89 immediately east of Arby's remnant 
property. Ivers I 154 P3d at 804. Arby's journey -through the appellate courts began 
when the trial court granted UDOT's motion in limine, precluding Arby's from presenting 
any evidence of severance damages to a jury. Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. 
Essentially, the Court of Appeals determined that because the portion of UDOT's 
construction project that interfered with Arby's property rights was not itself constructed 
on property taken from Arby's, causation for severance damages was not established. 
Ivers y. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005). 
Following the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, the Utah Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, but only on the issue of whether loss of view and visibility are factors in 
awarding severance damages. In short, this Court was called upon to address the Court of 
Appeals' causation analysis and to determine whether loss of view and visibility are 
appropriately considered in connection with awarding severance damages. 
5 
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"With respect to causation this Court properly rejected UDOT's assertion that in 
order to recover severance damages, 'the view-impairing structure must be built directly 
upon the severed land. Ivers I9154 P.2d at 807. This Court held: 
When land is condemned as part of a single project — even if 
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other 
than that which was condemned - if the use of the condemned 
property is essential to the completion of the project as a 
. whole^ the property owner is entitled to severance damages. 
Id • • • " 
However, this Court went on-to distinguish between view and visibility, and held 
there is no protected property right in visibility. Id. At 805-06. .Therefore, Arby's was 
precluded from presenting evidence of claimed damage related to loss of visibility. Id. 
Not only will the Ivers I ruling impact other property owners seeking just 
compensation, such as Admiral Beverage, but the Ivers case itself has now been in the 
crucible of the trial court and the effect of the Supreme Court's holding can be evaluated 
under the light of actual experience. 
At trial, the parties and the district court attempted to prepare jury instructions that 
were consistent with Ivers L However, the task was made difficult because of differing 
interpretations of the Ivers I ruling and because of other well-settled precedent that 
conflict with aspects of Ivers I. For example, other important condemnation cases that 
remain good law in Utah include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P*2d 926 
(Utah 1974); Utah Dept ofTransp v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987); Utah 
State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others. 
6 
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Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in 
condemnation cases remains intact following Ivers I These principles became confused 
in an attempt to follow Ivers L Compensation for severance damages is the difference in 
the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See, 
e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 247 
P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952), This determination of fair market value can only be made by 
considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this 
Court stated in Rohan, 
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but 
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a 
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the 
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value. 
487 P.2d at 859. 
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case reveal, the long-standing principle 
set forth in Rohan must be ignored in order to apply the Ivers /holding that loss of view 
is considered, but loss of visibility is not. 
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this 
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon 
Ivers I, it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific 
property right that was damaged, ie. view , or whether view was a factor to consider 
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B~6-511 for calculating severance damages, ie., the 
Attempts to isolate and appraise separate items of damages were rejected by this Court 
in Rohan. 487 P.2d at 859. 
7 
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reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No. 
31 ioformed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from 
[Arby's] property," indicating view was to be isolated and valued. (A copy of the Ivers 
Jury Instructions are attached hereto as Addendum "A"). Jury Instruction No. 33, 
contained the following caveat based upon hers I: "A property owner adjoining a public 
highway has .no right to. be- viewed by passing traf&c and is not entitled to -any 
compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing traffic?" (Emphasis 
added). In other words, despite being a factor sellers and buyers of real property would 
consider, the jury was not permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's 
• damages. . - . • ' . 
With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided ".The loss of view is 
to'be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway 
structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." This instruction was • 
offered by Arby'sin an attempt to reflect Miya. In Miya, this Court held the obstruction 
in that case was to be considered in determining severance damages. Specifically, 
severance damages were to be measured "by the effect the obstruction of view, created by 
the structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d 
at 929. However, the definition of market value was confusingly limited in Jury 
Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case you are to determine the fair market value of 
the loss of view from the defendants' property." (Emphasis added). Again, using Ivers I 
as guidance, jurors were told "just compensation includes Hie fair market value of the loss 
•8 
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of view from defendant's property." Addendum "A" at Jury Instruction No. 39. Under 
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and place upon it a monetary 
value. 
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to 
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' properly by determining the 
fair market value as of December 30, 2002. Id. at Jury Instruction No. 40. In short, not 
only were the Juiy Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible task of 
attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions caused 
by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into account in 
valuing real property. The jury instructions were drafted pursuant to the parties' best 
efforts to comply with hers L 
• The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony 
UDOT's appraiser, Phillip Cook, was permitted to give at trial. Cook's opinion was that 
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Prior to trial, 
Arby's attempted to restrict Cook's testimony through a motion in limine. (A copy of the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum CCB"). 
However, the district court denied the motion in limine and permitted Cook to testify that 
in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses, Arby's had 
sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project Cook's opinion 
was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated fast-food 
restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses. See, generally, 
9 
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Addendum "B'\ At trial, Cook also advocated that a distinction can legitimately be made 
between categories of properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is 
not compensable. In connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact 
on the -value .of Arby's remnant property, Cook took the position that view only has value 
for certain types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end 
residential properties, office.spaces with views of title Wasatch Mountains, and hotel 
rooms with views of the San .Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. (A copy, of 
portions of Cook's trial testimony is attached hereto as Addendum CCC")- In other words, 
according to UDOT. and its '.appraiser, under Ivers I, the constitutional- rights, are 
' selectively applied. Just compensation is. not afforded to everyone who has property 
damaged by a condemneds actions. UDOT was .able to use the Ivers I decision to 
•continue, to deny just compensation to Arby's.. Under Ivers I, Arby's property .right was 
narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the jury to buy in to UDOT's claim there 
was no damage. 
The type of segregation attempted at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents 
just compensation from being awarded to property owners because certain factors 
impacting value are disregarded and it opens the door to the type of testimony given by 
Phillip Cook that a property,owner need not be compensated for loss of view, even when 
the causation element is satisfied. In Ivers, Arby's was awarded no severance damages 
for loss of view although it was undisputed the property's view has been obstructed. Zero 
damages does not qualify as just compensation for damaged property. 
10 
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Arby's agrees with Admiral Beverage and submits the ruling in Ivers I is 
unconstitutional inasmuch as it interferes with the constitutional mandate of just 
compensation, as revealed by the results of the Ivers trial itself. Attempting to isolate the 
issue of loss of view prevents a property owner from being made whole based upon a fair 
comparison of property value before and after the talcing. See Utah State Road 
Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) ("just compensation means the 
owners must be put in as good as position money wise as they would have occupied had 
their property not been taken")- The distinction between loss of view and visibihty 
resulted in a denial of Arby's constitutional rights. That result will be perpetuated in 
other cases if the decision is allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Arby's, as Amicus Curiae, respectfully requests this 
Court overturn the portion of the Ivers I ruling that distinguishes between view and 
visibility as factors to be evaluated in determining severance damages. 
Respectfully submitted this \J day of September, 2010. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
SNALD J. WINDER 
M N W.HOLT 
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ADDENDUM 
.A. Ivers J^y Instructions 
B. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine 
C. Excerpts of PMllip Cook Trial Testimony 
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IN THE SECOND1 DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY' 
,'.'..''. '""'."' "
;
 '.' "STATE OF UtAH.': ' . '" ' ."• 
.UTAH.DEPARTMENT OF 
.TRANSPORTATION, ' 
. -. • Plaintiff,.. , • . , . . ' . 
vs. 
JAMES IVERS; KATHEPJNE G..HAVAS.;. 
.and P AND F POOD. SERVICES (Tenant), 
Defendants. •• 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 020700665 
Judge Michael G.. Allphin. 
Ladies and'Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one (1) through 
twenty-one (21), given to you at the beginning of the trial. You will receive additional 
instructions at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your 
conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be carefully followed. 
Dated this day: ^/S-jD 
DISTRICT CO' 
MICHAEL G, 
JUDGE 
LPHTN 
Nfc\ 
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1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Before the trial of this case begins, Ineed to give you some instructions to help you. . 
understand what you-will see and hear. ..... 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff, hi this case the plaintiff is the • ••" 
UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. The party who is being sued is called-the • 
defendant, hi this case the defendants are JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G, HAVAS^and P • •  
AND F FOOD SERVICES. . ••• . . - . ; . . 
The defendants seek damages for diminution*of fair .market value for loss of view •....... 
resulting from the condemnation of their property and the construction of an elevated •  
public highway. • 
The plaintiff has already compensated the defendants for all other damages related to the 
. condemnation of the defendants'property. 
2. GENERAL ADMONITIONS ' 
You have now been sworn as jurors in this case. I want to impress on you the seriousness 
of being a juror. You must come to the case without bias and attempt to reach a fair verdict based 
on the evidence and on the law. Before we begin, I need to explain how to conduct yourselves 
during the trial 
Do sot allow anything that happens outside this courtroom to affect your decision. During 
the trial do not talk about this case with anyone, including your family, friends, or even your 
fellow jurors until after I tell you that it is time for you to decide the case. When it is time to 
decide the case, you will meet in the jury room. You may discuss the case only in the jury room, 
at the end of the trial, when all of the jurors are present. After the trial is over and I have released • 
you from the jury, you may discuss the case with anyone, but you are not required to do so. 
During the trial do not read about the case in the newspapers or on the internet or listen to 
radio or television broadcasts about the trial. If a headline or an announcement catches your 
attention, do not read or listen further, Media accounts may be inaccurate or may contain matters 
that are not evidence, 
You must decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this trial and the 
mstructions that I provide. Do not investigate the case or conduct any experiments. Do not do any 
research on your own or as a group. Do not use dictionaries, the internet, or other reference 
materials, Do not contact anyone to assist you. Do not visit or view the scene of the events in this 
case. If you happen to pass by the scene do not stop or investigate. 
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Evidence can only be presented one piece at a 
time. Do not form or express an opinion about the case while the trial is going on. You must not 
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.. decide on a verdict until after yon have heard all of fhe evidence and have discussed it thoroughly • 
•with your fellow jurors in your deliberations. . • . :* . • .-. •• 
•• -Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or pubhc opinion influence yorn verdict •:•...•-y.. 
.At the end of the trial, Twill explain the law that yon must follow to reach your -verdict: •". •. ' , • • 
'/You mxist" followthe law' as T explain it to you;'eveh if you:'do hot agree wi ..-,-•. . !;•• ••.-"..•'•.••'. 
v . 3 , - - F U R T H E R A D M O N I T I O N A B O U T E L E C T R O N I C D E V I C E S . . • ' • , • , ; • , • ' - : - • ; • • . ' . • • . 
• •  .-• •". • :;Seii'0US.pfoblefns have'b'e6n caused around the country by jurors usixig computer, and •/• <• -,%-. • • , • •: ". •*•'.: 
. • electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigates: case, or to shark.--v •  v. 
. with.- others our thoughts about the trial, and if s easy, to do' :so with the intemet/and instant •: •.'• ••• "•• 
communication devices or sendees, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so on. • . 
• However, please understand that the.rules -of evidence and procedure have developed, over •''•-•• 
hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the-entire . • . 
• system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your- decisions based on" evidence presented •.. • 
. to you m court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as jurors if yon 
•conduct your own investigations or.communicate about this trial with others. 
• Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling" fhe 
parties, issues, or counsel;,"Twittering" with friends about the trial; using Blackberries or 
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial'updates on Facebook pages; using. 
WiMpedia or other .internet information sources, and so OIL Even nsing something as seemingly 
' innocent as "-Google Maps" can result in a mistrial. ' • . 
Post-trial investigations are commonand can disclose these improper activities. If they 
are discovered, they will.be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to-be retried, • 
at substantial cost. ' • . 
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror. 
So I must warn you again - do not use your cell phone or computer to investigate or 
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do no interest research 
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so. . 
4. ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LAWYERS 
You and I and the lawyers are all officers of the court, and we play important roles in the 
trial 
It's my role to supervise the trial and to decide all legal questions, such as deciding 
objections to evidence and deciding the meaning of the law. I will also instruct you on the law 
that you must apply. 
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• -It's your role to foHomthatlaw and .to decide;what 'the facts-are, The facts generally relate 
to who, what, when, why, and how or how much, The facts must be supported by-evidence. • 
Neither the lawyers norl actually decide the case. That is your role. You should decide the case 
based upon the evidence.presented in court, andthe instructions that I give you. . . . . . . . 
It's the lawyers' role to .present evidence,-.generally by calling and questioning witnesses-
and presenting, exhibxte, Eachlawyer will also try to persuade you to decide*-the-case in favor -of« 
his or her client • 
Tilings that you see on television and in the movies may not accurately reflect the way 
real trials should be- conducted, -Real trials should be conducted with professionalism, courtesy 
and'civility. : • -.- • • . • " . . . . • • • •....•: . ; . . - . . • • •_ . - •. 
5, ORDER OF TRIAL 
The trial will generally, proceed-as follows:-. •:. • • • • • . 
(1) Opening statements. The lawyers will make opening statements, outlining what the 
case is about and what they think the evidence will show. 
(2) Presentation of evidence. The defendants will offer evidence first, followed by the 
plaintiff. The parties may later offer more evidence, called rebuttal evidence, after hearing .the 
witnesses and seeing the exhibits. 
(3) Instructions on the law. Throughout the trial and after the evidence has been folly 
presented, I will instruct you. on the law that you must apply. You must obey these instructions. 
You are not allowed to reach decisions that go against the law. 
. (4) Closing arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will . 
share with you their views of the evidence, how is relates to the law and how they think you 
should decide the case. 
(5) Jury deliberations. The final step is for you to go to the jury room and discuss the case 
among yourselves until you reach a verdict. Your verdict must be based on the evidence 
presented in court and-on my instructions on the law. I will.give you more instructions about that 
step at a later time. 
6. SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS NOT SIGNIFICANT 
From time to time throughout the trial, I will instinct you on the law. The order in which I 
give the instructions has no significance. You must consider the instructions in their entirety, 
giving them all equal weight. I do not intend to emphasize any particular instruction, and neither 
should you. 
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..7.r:. - JURORS MUS^POLLOW.^THE INSTRTJGTIONS . -••.,. . •.;. ..... : r ^;.:•-.-/.v..: • 
.•..*;• .fTheinstaotions\£to ,.• \ • 
•.. instructions even if you disagree with. them. ••••,. . • .*. '
 ? .:•,,••• ;->.^  •  .•,...-..,-..;. • ••:.•.- • • ;•'-: 
8...- •.. JBROia-MAy-NOTDECIDGE-BASED-O ,••.-• , . ^ \ . ,-:\ 
: :•.•-• -PREJUDICE-. '•-••,,,•: .-•.•• •;:-. ' ' • • • . • . • • • , • . . . ' . " , .
 A'. •.-:•:.;; :>.^.;V : , . . ' 
, You must not decide this .case for or against anyone because you feel sorry iox .anyone pr •.. ;•.;••*. 
•• angry at -anyone.. You must decide this .case based on the facts a^nd fhe law, ^ifihout regard ±q ••.. •.:•.• •  .'. •... :: 
.' sympathy, "passion Dr.rprejudice: •-; . . *..,'•; •'• ..••.•• .v ;•..-., :•- ' . . :-r''':. .*.. . -, -.-.:••'. -v-i- • 
9. ••. .NOTE-TAKING .-•,•; . •.,.. \ v-';v -.- .-/.-• r - • • 
" If you wish, you may take notes 'during the trial and have those notes with you when you . 
•. discuss the case.. We will-provide 'you with writing materials if you need them; 'If you. take notes\>; \ . N 
do not over do it, and .do not let your note-taking distract you from f ollowirig the evidence,, and 
you.should use them only as. a tool to aid your personal memory when it comes time to decide the, • .. • ,. 
case. • "'• • • . . ' " ' . • ' . - . . . • . . . • • • • 
.10.' • RULES APPLICABLE TO RE CESSES' 
•From time to time, I will call for a recess. It may be for a few •minutes, a lunch break,; 
overnight or longer. You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess.' You 
must obey the following instructions during the recesses: . ' • •. 
• Do not talk about this case with .anyone - not family, Mends or even each other. While • 
you are in the courthouse, the clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so 
•that people will not try to discuss the case with' you. • • • . 
If anyone tries to discuss the case in your presence, despite your telling them not to, tell 
the cleric orthe bailiff that you need to see me. If you must talk to me, do not discuss it with your 
fellow jurors. 
Although it is normal human tendency to talk with other people, do not talk or otherwise 
communicate with any of the parties or their lawyers or with any witness. B y this, I mean do not 
talk with them at all, .even to pass the time of day. 
Finally, do not make up your mind about what the verdict should be until after you have 
gone to the jury room to decide the case, and yon' and your fellow jurors have discussed the 
evidence. Keep an open mind until then. 
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11. PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
• • When I tell* you that a party has the burden of proof .-or that a party must prove^something. 
by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must persuade yon, by .the evidence... 
presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be true than not true. 
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be'beyond a reasonable, doubt, but 
I must emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case. In a civil case such as this one, .a 
different level'Ofproofappli-es;proofbyapreponderance of evidence. . • 
Another way of saying-this is proof by the.greater weight of the evidence, however slight •• 
Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of witnesses nor the-amount of . 
testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence. In weighing the 
evidence, you should consider all of the evidence that applies to a fact, no matter which party 
presented it. The weight given to e&ch piece of evidence is for you' do decide. • 
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more likely true than not, 
then you must find that the fact has been proved, On the other hand, if you decide that the 
evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must find that the fact has not been 
proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that fact. 
At the close of the trial, I will instruct you in more detail about the specific elements that 
must be proved. 
12, EVIDENCE 
ccBvidence" is anything that tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact. It can be the 
testimony of a witness or documents or objects or photographs or stipulations or certain qualified 
opinions or any combination of these things. 
You must entirely disregard any evidence for which I sustain an objection and any 
evidence that I order to be struck. . 
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and you must 
entirely disregard it. Do not make any investigation about Hie facts in this case. Do not make any 
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view locations involved in the.case, or 
inspect any tilings or articles not produced in court. Do not look things up on the internet. Do not 
look for information in books, dictionaries or public or private records that are not produced in 
court. Do not let anyone else do any of these things for you. . .. 
Do not consider anything that you may have heard or read about, this case hi the media or 
byword of mouth or other out-of-court communication. 
The lawyers might stipulate to a fact or I might take judicial notice of a fact. Otherwise, 
what I say and what the lawyers say usually are not evidence. 
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•••• . •• You are to consider only the evidence in -the case: but yon are not expected to abandon, :.f/./, •• • ; 
your common sense. You are permitted to interpret the -evidence in light of yonr-experience.. •. •" • . . 
13; DIRE-CTANDC^ • • . \ , *••:.'• ..^V-:' r<: s • * 
A fact may be proved'by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 'evidence ••••;••.>••': 
• consists of facts or'circumstances' thafallow someone to .reasonably-infer the truth of the.facts to. • * •;•• •.•• '/.:•••' f\ 
be proved; For example, -if the fact to he-proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry-pie ,^ and a - •..••.. • 
' • witness- testifies'that ''she saw- Jobnny'.talce a bite of the cherrypie, that is direct.evidence-of the-, -v'-v ••• : •.'•:*.:.; 
fact, Ifthe witness testifiesfhat-she saw Jokmy wittL Cherries smeared on Ms face and.an,empty:„- ;-.•'.. • !-.. 
. pie plate in Ms hand,- that is .circumstantial evidence of the fact •' . . . ; • . . • • ; • ',:.••*,•...'.•; - .- ... -./.. :•:.,. 
14. . BELIEVABELr^ . . * • •• •:"-: '• • ••.... ;.. \v^.;'.;y.- : =:-"; : :. 
.Testhnonym this case will be:givenunde3; oath. Yaumust evaluate the-behevability-of ;.:•••• •Jr "• .*• • •• 
that testimony. You may beli-eve all or any part of the testimony of a witness. You ma]/.also . •.: • . ••••." ; 
believe one witness-against many witnesses- or many against one,.in accordance with your honest • -... .• 
•convictions. In evaluating the testimony of .a witness, you may want to consider .the foHowing: ...... : / : . 
(1) Personal interest. Do you.believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected-one way 
.or the other by any personal interest the witness has in the case? 
;(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by any bias or 
prejudice? ' • . • • . ' • • 
(3) Demeanor. Is there anything about .the witness's appearance, conduct, ox actions that • • ' 
causes-you to give more or less weight to the testimony? 
' (4) Consistency. How does .that testimony tend to -support or not support other believable 
evidence that is offered in the case? - . • 
(5) Knowledge, Did Hie witness have a good opportunity to know what he or she is 
testifying about? 
(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable? 
(7) Reasonableness.'Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light of human 
experience? 
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate testimony. You are the • 
ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability. 
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15. • INCONSISTENT 'STATEMENTS • 
You may believe that a -witness, on another .occasion, made a' statement inconsistent with •. 
.•that witnesses ^ testimony given.here; That doesn't mean thatyou are required:to disregar&the:,.-..:'-
testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe the witness. • > •/ • . • 
• 16..- -EFFECTOF WILLKULLYFAIiSE TESTIMONY ;-->V " '-
• •• If .jyou believe- any-witness has intention-ally.testified, falsely about any important-matter, .• . 
youmay disregard ;j(he.enth'e-testimony of .that witness, or you may-disregard only.intentionally • 
false testimony.- ' -\ - . • • • . * . • ./: • . •"- • •.:; 
17. STIPULATIONS :• .•••:, -j , 
• A stipulation--is an "agreement Unless Iinstruct you otherwise, when the lawyers .on both 
sides stipulate or agree to a fact, you must accept the. stipulation as evidence .and regard .that.fact 
as proved. The'parties have stipulated to the following facts: .. • . 
a) ' The legal description of the property subject to this litigation; 
b) That the photograph of the subj ect property introduced into evidence by the 
defendants is an accurate representation of the subject property; and 
c) That the date of valuation is December 30,2002. 
Since the parties have agreed on these facts, you must accept them as true for purposes of 
this case. 
18. OBJECTIONS AND RULINGS ON EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE 
From time to time during the trial, I may have to make rulings on objections or motions 
made by the lawyers. Lawyers on each side of a case have a right to obj ect when .the other side 
offers evidence that the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not think less of a lawyer 
or a party because the lawyer makes objections. You should not conclude from any ruling or 
comment that I make that I have any opinion about the merits of fee case or that I favor one side 
or the other. And if I sustain an objection to a question, you should not draw any conclusions 
from the question itself. 
During the trial I may have to confer with the lawyers out of your hearing about questions 
of law or procedure. Sometimes you may be excused from the courtroom for that same reason. I 
will try to limit these interruptions as much as possible, but you should remember the importance 
of the matter you are here to decide. Please be patient even though the case may seem to go 
slowly. 
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• 1-5, • • STATEMENT OF OPINION . 
. . Under-limited'circumstances., Twiilall^w-.awi 
. have .to. believe an opinion, wheth^ormoHiLcomes.ft^^ .-.. .. ... 
. -testimony-as you wpuld any-other evidence, and.-give it the weight.you thipkjtdessrv.es. • . •,.-.-.., 
. • : % , EmBT-TONESS. , ' . - ' . ' • " / • •.;./' ; : -> : 1 : : I : - , : ' ' v ; . 
. . • .. The•.Blle's,of3yidenc,e^ Qrdinarilry• do.-np£peimi*:fhe. opinions^of a."witness tor-lge.reQeived-a.S:. • •  , 
. evidence. An exception to this rule-exists:in the. case-pf: expert-witnesses. .Witnesses who;':.hy«.-- •••-. • _•. 
.education,' study and-experience, havebeeome expert -in some art, science, profession or.calliag,: • \;. 
' may state opinions-as to- any such matter in which -that witness.is qualified as ..an exp.ert,:SQ;long. • ...... 
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such ..expert opinion and;fhe •:.-.? .-. 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Givo it the-weight you thihk it 
• deservesi-If you should decide-that the .opinions of-an. expert.-witness are not-based upon- • • ';• - . • -1: • 
• sufficient-education .and experience, or if you should conclude -that'the reasons given -ki< support./ ••;...-
of .the opinions -are.not.'sound, or that such opinions are outwei^ed by other-evidence^ youmay . 
disregard the opinion entirely. \ . ' • " • • ' ' • . . - . • . 
21; ' CONELICHNG TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS . . \ . / • ;•' 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of. "J. Philip Cook-and Jack Brown . 
and Gary Free, you may compare and weight the opinion of one against that .of another. • la -doing-
this, you may consider -the qualifications and credibility, of each,'as well as thexeasohs. of each 
opinion and" the facts on which the opinions SIQ based'.- • ; 
[OPEttiNG.STAIEMENTS.BYCOUNSEL]] . 
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED] 
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22. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The cleric has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages,'Which-. ,• 
contain instructions relating to the procedure that you should follow and the .particular laws-or r- . 
rales that apply in this case. These additional instructions begin with instruction number'twenty- -
two (22), .We will now. read those instructions.: ".-' Y ' • ' . ' . ; . ' . . : : \ 
23. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE :JURY ROOM 
You may-take the following things with-you when you go into the jury room to discuss.-. • 
this case: 
a. All exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. Your notes (if any); 
c. Your copy of these instructions; and 
d. The verdict form or forms. 
24. NOTES 
The use of notes in the jury-room to refresh your memory is perfectly acceptable. But let 
.me caution you not to rely excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a yerdict 
independently, after consultation with the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own 
memory of the evidence. One juror's opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely 
because that juror has taken notes. 
25, SELECTION OF JURY FOREPERSON AND DELIBERATION 
When you go into the jury room, your first taslc is to select a. foreperson. The foreperson 
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict form when it's completed, The 
foreperson should not dominate the discussions. The foreperson's opinions should be given the 
same weight as the opinions of the other jurors. 
After you select the foreperson you must discuss with one another - or deliberate - with a 
view to reaching an agreement. Your attitude and conduct during discussions are very important. 
As you begin your discussions, it is not helpful to say that your mind is already made up. 
Do not announce that you are determined to vote a certain way or that youi; mind cannot be 
changed. Each of you must decide the* case for yourself, but only after discussing the case with 
your fellow jurors. 
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.. •, • Do not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is wrong. Likewise, you. .••.••;.-. _• 
should not surrender your honest, convictions just to end the deliberations or to. agree with.-.ofher • - • ' . : . . . 
jurors. .. • - • • •...-;.,.. 
.•.•--:;.-
 :. • -. 26.- . :WBATTODOIFTOU'-HAVE-QXJES!H^ \ -<, ,:r ^ , : -v:• :- . 
.-• . •
 ;
-ffyoUthh^youneedmore . .*..„:.•»: ••• 
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate.- . • -v. •' 
'. ••: • • However; these- instractions should- cphtain all the information you need to reach-a verdict-based : jy.
 :-..- : •. -. : 
upon the evidence. • ' ' • . - , • ; . ..-.;.. v-
27. FOCUS.ONTHIS'CASE.ALQNE'- ' •• ••
 ; w - : ,;.,v.:-, • }"</. : - . - ; <•:. 
Your duty is to decide this case and this, case alone. You should not use this case-as a • ' • 
forumfor correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing'.'individual ox '•-.•••: .. ... 
• collective views- about anything other thari the issues you are called upon to- -decide.; .Your, verdict • • 
'' should reflect the facts .as found by you applied to the law as explained 'in HIGBO instructions and 
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives.-, ' • . . . ' ' • • . . . ' 
The final .test of the.qualify of your service willbe-the verdict you return. You will- . . . 
contribute to' efficient-judicial, administration if-you focus exclusively on this case -and return a • . 
just and proper verdict • . • • • ' . ' • ' 
.28. . .DO NOT SPECULATE OR RESORT TO CHANCE •' . > 
•"When you deliberate, do not flip a coin, speculate or choose one juror's-opinions at •.. • 
random. Evaluate the evidence and come to a decision that is supported by the evidence. 
. If you-decide that a-party is entitled to recover damages, you must then agree upon the 
amount of money to award that party. Each of you should state your own independent judgment 
on what the amount should be. You must thoughtfully consider the amounts • suggested, evaluate 
them according to these instructions and the evidence, and reach an agreement .on the amount. • 
You must not agree in advance to average the estimates. 
29.. AGREEMENTON SPECIAL VERDICT 
I am going to give you a form called the Special Verdict that contains a single, question. 
You must answer the question based upon the evidence you have stm and heard during this trial, 
Because this is not a criminal case, your verdict does not have to be unanimous. At least 
six jurors must agree on'the answer to the question. 
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to the question, the foreperson should 
sign and date the verdict form and tell the bailiff you have finished. The bailiff will escort you 
back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed Special Verdict with you, 
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30. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER-TEE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED '• . \ • 
After you have given your verdict to the court, I, or the clerk, may ask each of you about -
it to malce sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box; and you may Leave 
.at any time.: You-may.remain in the courtrooms?you- wish to watch the rest -of the proceedings, • - • 
which should be quite brief. . . - ' . . • • 
After you are excused, you may talk about the-.case with' anyone. likewise, you are not • • 
• -required t<5 tallcabout it If anyone attempts to talc to you::aboiit the -case when you :don:-twantto . 
do that, please tell the court cleric or bailiff. .'-.-. .' 
. 31.. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS' . ' • . ' " '• •'•<' " 
This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the State of Utah for 
the purpose of condemning and acquiring private' property of the defendant, landowners for. a , 
public purpose. The party commencing this action,.'known as the plaintiff, is the Utah. ••...'•••• 
Department of Transportation, and the property .owners^ -known as the defendants, are James-
Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in this case include .the value of 
the loss of view from the defendants' property; 
32. OWNER TESTIFYING-
The-defendants have rendered an opinion as to the value of loss of view from their 
property. In considering the weight to be given to the defendants* testimony on the value of the 
loss of view from their property, you may consider the defendants' bias and personal 
involvement^  the: defendants' specific knowledge of the property, and the defendants5 experience 
and qualifications to testify regarding land value,-
33. TAKING . 
la this case, -the condemnation or taking" involves a parcel of kad which was 
condemned as an essential component for the plaintiffs project to expand and elevate U.S. 
Highway 89 over Shepard Lane in Fannington, Utah. 
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public highway, and a 
reasonable right to receive air and light from an adjacent public highway and a view from their 
property. 
If you find that the fair market value of the remaining property is less in the "after 
condition" than the "before condition"-because of a loss of view, then you may award damages 
based on the reduced value of the remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain 
and not contingent, remote or speculative. ' • 
\ 
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A property owner adj oining a public highway has no right to be seen by passing traffic 
and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing' 
traffic. 
34. LOSS'OF VIEW - . ' . 
in this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a legal right to 
recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss .of view is to be measured by t h e ^ ^ d • 
the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the m a r k e ^ ^ S 
d f ^ ^ f a B l ' o f S e f ^ r t y . ' . * ™ = = * ^ ^ 
35... DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY P E ^ ^ 
. The measure, of damages for permanent injury to land is.the difference in the fair-market 
value' of .the land immediately before and- after the injury. This is called "diminution m value."" * 
36. . FAIR MARKET VALUE . 
• Pair market value is the highest-probable price-estimated in terms of money that land 
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with areasonabletime allowed in which to 
find'abuyer with knowledge of .all the uses- and purposes'to which the land was adapted.... 
• In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willmg buyer wouldhavepdd 
wilting seller in ail aims-lengfhtransaction with both -pBitios being folly informed concerning all ." 
of the advantages and disadvantages to thepropeity, .and with neither acting under any 
compulsion to buy or sell. . • • : . . . • ' 
•In this case you are to determine the fair market value of the-loss of view from .the 
defendants' property. • ' • . • • 
37. BURDEN OF PROOF 
The defendants have the burden of proving the amount of damages for diminution in 
value of the subject property. 
38. * COMPARABLE SALES 
Some of the witnesses have testified about sales of property similar to the property 
involved in this case. You may consider the price voluntarily paid for similar property under 
similar circumstances in helping you determine the value of Hie loss of view from the defendants' 
property in this case. Comparable sales are factors to be considered but are not the sole basis in 
determining fair market value of the property in dispute. 
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39. JUST COMPENSATION 
The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants5 property because of public 
necessity, hi this case, just compensation must be paid for the value of the loss of view from the 
defendants' property. Just compensation includes the fair market value'of the loss of view from 
the defendants' property. 
40. COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES 
In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid to the defendants 
in the following manner: You will decide the value of the loss of view from the defendants' 
property by determining the fair market value as of December 30s 2002. 
41. INTEREST 
You are not to consider interest in assessing the value of the defendants' property, nor add 
it to the compensation you award. I will compute and add such "interest to the compensation 
assessed by you. You are not to consider any costs of these proceedings since any such costs will 
be dealt with by me in accordance with the law. 
.1 
42. LOSS OF PROMTS 
In arriving at your detemirnatidn of fair market value of-the subject property, you shall 
not consider alleged injury to -any business or business operation conducted on or about the 
dependants' property as of the date of condemnation as a separate element of recoverable 
damages. Nor should you consider any claim for loss of profit or income from any business 
operation caused by the condemnation of the land and improvements for the public use as a 
separate element of recoverable damages. The plaintiff in this action must pay to the defendant 
the fair market value of the property being acquired, which has occurred but for the defendants' 
loss of view from the property. Such factors as claimed damage to business operations or loss of 
profits are not recoverable., but maybe considered as bearing upon estabhshing the market value 
of the subj ect property. 
43. HIGHEST AM) BEST USE 
The defendants are entitled to just compensation based upon the highest and best use for 
which the property was reasonably adapted on Hie date of taking, without limitation to the use 
that was actually made of the property. The highest and best use means its most advantageous 
and valuable use, having due regard to the existing conditions and reasonable needs or wants of 
the community, including such needs or wants as may probably be expected in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. The term "probably" means that the property would more likely than not be 
put to a particular use except for the taking. 
An owner may show present or future uses which are sufficiently practicable and 
probable as to likely influence the price which an informed purchaser would have given for the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• ^property at the 1me (rf^ . ..
 :t. ••,.;...-.. 
probable as to have an. effect on the fair market value of the land at the time, of taking.. A purely •, .•-. -;. *:• .,;•. : • 
. . . . imaginative'or.speculate • , "..• ..v.;-...'.... ••..••/ -.-: ;:^- :o^.. ' ,o.:; ' ' . 
-. ••-.... ..In-determining highestand best use^youmay take into consideration-: (1) the aGtaal.use.of--^v-;^
 ;.'v. .
: 
the property-at the date fixed for evaluation; (2)'its location; '(3).its topography;-.(4) the use pf the' '* • •. •. 
• \suirounding properties, both past and present; (5) the zoning-of the property at the time in. ••,•'. •• ? - :.,::. * • 
•.questions ortheiack thereof; (6) the availability;of water and uiility facilities .as-.of that time; (7) •.-• .•..:••.• '••• 
] market conditions in the general vicinity; (8) the supply and demand for comparable -property.in j . ••; . .• ,.:s ' • 
. • the general, area; and. (9)/.any other factors-wMch you bdieve the-M
 : 
• seller would take into account in fixing the' probable itself the subject property, as o'fDec'ember- • • '••...:• ..-: •".;. 
,.•
 ;3;0?20'02;x}rv^^ , • •• • • . . . • •>;.. ••':\ • ... ;.•-. -•:'..-. s •.,./• ,..••-..•.. 
•  44. '..ACCESS • 
: .. You.are instructedihat the use -of. the -highways and 'Streets may be Jimited, c'ontrolled'and'-.... \. . . .-
regulated by 'the exercise of the .police .power .to the extent-necessary to promote.the'health, safety ,. . 
•and welfare- of the public. However, the-right to enter .and. leave a person.5 s land cannot be entirely •  ' . • • 
cut offJ?ree-and convenient access shall be provided to an owner who had free and convenient. 
, access prior to the'enactment of the regulation. •' 
'• ;45. ;;SPECDLATIVE-COMPENSATION' '•' 
• "' in determining just 'compensation, you are not to take into consideration'imaginative or. 
speculative values or damages- You'are.not to consider, the price for which the property would 
sell.under special or extraordinary .circumstances, but only such values that axe real and supported 
' by the evidence. 
. 46. ': • VIEWING OF PROPERTY -
You may use any information or knowledge obtained by you while viewing the property 
in this case only for the purpose of determining the weight and apphcability of the testimony and 
evidence introduced in this trial. 
Your view of the. property is not evidence, in and of itself upon which a verdict may be 
based. You may use it' only to aid you in better understanding the testimony of the witnesses. 
47. SYMPATHY OR ANIMOSITY NOT TO BE CONSIDERED 
The plaintiff has a legal right to condemn land under appropriate circumstances for the 
purpose of constructing public projects. You shall not assess compensation in favor of the 
defendant solely because the land may have been taken against the defendants' will. Rather, your 
verdict shall be limited to the fair market value of the loss of view from the defendants' property. 
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. 48.. SETTLEMENT 0E VALUEOFPROPERTY . : • ..:,.,.. . . . . : • • .,<•;• 
. . . .Tlie-p'arties'-have aheady reached agreement on the fair market value. of .the property taken 
for the highway construction. The landowner has already been fully paid this value. . • • . . . . • 
« • • The .purpbj&e of this- trial is to determine if the landowner is.to receive any additional -. 
compensationfor the value, of the loss of view from -their property. You are to. determine that. .• 
dollar value, if any. •' • . , . . ' • . . . . *. ••••...,> . . . • . • , . 
•49.-: ARGUMENTS .OF COUNSEL NOT EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES . •..;/:..,,•-> -.-. 
• Yo'u-may consider the arguments of the attorneys to assist you in decidmg the .amounts, of • 
damages, but their arguments are not evidence. . • • . • 
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Donald X Winder #3519 • 
John W.Holt #5.720 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
175 "West 200 South. #4000 
P.O.Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 • • 
Attorneys-far Defendants 
IN THE SBCOHD JHDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND F0JRDAY3S COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH-DEPAKTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, .. 
•plaintiff,-
vs. 
JAMES T7ERS; ICATHERME G. HAVAS,
 / 
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant) 
Defendants. 
.. "MEMORANDUMTN-SUPPORTOF . 
' DEFENDANTS.M0fIONWLMINE AND 
MOTION'TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF J.' 
PHELLTF COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT 
Civil No. 020700665 
Judge Michael Allphin 
Defendants (collectively referred to herein as "Arby's"), by and through, counsel, hereby 
respectiully submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion 
to Strike Portions of J. Phillip Cook's Appraisal. 
INTRODUCTION 
Arby's has sustained severance damages as a result of Plaintiff s ("tTDOT") construction 
project to elevate U;S, 89 over Shepard Lane in Farmington, Utah, After a lengthy appeals 
process, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled Arby's is entitled present evidence to a jury to 
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support the severance damages claim. UDOThas attempted through various motions to preclude 
Arby-s from'recovering damages and has now produced an appraisal from J. Phillip Cook (the 
"Cook Appraisal"), where Cook opines, Defendants have suffered absolutely no damages 
resulting from loss of view. Cook's opinion is based upon irrelevant hearsay and opinions from 
lay witnesses not qualified as'experts. Additionally, Cook has failed to show the information-'he • 
obtained from, lay witnesses is of the type reasonably relied upon by real estate appraisers to 
form their conclusions. Further/the facts and data upon which Cook relies for his opini oris-have • 
not been .disclosed to Arby's; 'Relevant portions • of the Cook Appraisal, entitled "Market; 
'Participant Interviews/' pp. 51-55, are attached hereto as Exhibit "A."" Cook..should not be' . 
pamutted-to testify at trial concerning opinions based upon hearsay'and lay opinions, He should ' 
also be excluded from-, testifying based upon irrelevant data. . . . . . . . 
.••' • • ARGUMENT 
. ' " • POINT!' .. 
COOK RELIES UPON INADM3SSABLE HEARSAY 
Cook's Appraisal concludes Arby's loss of view has not negatively impacted the value of 
fiie subject real property. This opinion is based upon opinions from lay witnesses Cook or his 
assistants allegedly interviewed. Exhibit "A." This is problematic for numerous reasons. First, 
the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court statements 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted Rule 801(c), UTAH R. Evm. Hearsay is generally 
2 
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inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. BVHX Cook's interviews of lay witnesses do not meet any 
of the exceptions to the hearsay role under Rule 803, UTAHR, BVID, l 
The Utah .Supreme .Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness 'based his 
opinion in part -on out of court statements, cc[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked 
in the form of an -expert opinion,- would have -been impemiissible and potentially highly 
prejudicial." .Edwards v. Didericlcseiit'597 P.2d 1328L, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay -evidence 
is clearly not admissible at trial. • • ' • . ' . . . 
• • " - ' " ' ••
 :
: PQ3NT2- • ' ' . • ' • ' * ' •.:" 
• While some .-of Coolers interviewees are named., many, of "them are not identified and-are 
.only referenced vaguely .and generally. For example/ on page:51, Cook .-says -he spoke wife "the 
managers .of several fast-food restaurants,.." Exhibit "A5?. On page 52, he states: ccWe also 
interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site selection 
criteria and view out." Id. Cook identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but 
does not identify any of the other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he 
allegedly spoke. 
Moreover, insufficient infonnation is provided concerning the background and 
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value of the 
1
 The mt&rviow material is hearsay upon hearsay-to the eztmt Cook relied upon other -parties to 
conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into his Appraisal. It 
is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along statements they allegedly 
heard from others. 
3 
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subject real property. What axe their job duties and backgrounds? Is the valuation of loss of . 
view any part of their job duties? "These individuals are apparently involved in managing 
restaurants/but-they.are notieal estate experts. For example, alleged statements of an-individual 
named Treesa Kurtzenbom about the subject property is used to support Cook's opinion that 
Arby's suffered no damage. No- information is. given concerning Ms. Ktortzenborn'-s expertise or 
familiarity with the subject property, yet .she freely .speculates and opines that other factors 
impacted the value of fee--subject property more.than the view, obstniofion, .There is no • 
foundation for such/a -speculative opinion from .a. lay witness and.no explanation forwhy Cook-
would incorporate such a-statement from alayiritness, into Ms-own expert "analysis;. This. Court. 
-mast insure'that an "expert'witness is truly testifying as -an.expert and not-merely serving as a 
conduit through which 'inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United States v. Cormier, 
•468 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir, 2006) -("an expert .witness may-not simply komnxaiize the out-of-court 
statements of others as Ms testimony") (citation omitted), . . 
It IB clear the lay witnesses Cook interviewed were asked to render opinions based upon 
scientific, technical or specialized knowledge; Rule 7G2, UTAHR, EVUX reserves such testimony 
to experts wbo bave the requisite fi<knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." Id. 
None of Cook's interviewees has been designated a witness in this matter, expect or otherwise, 
Lay witness opinions are limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R, BVID., to the witness's own 
perception, rather than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of 
Cook's'interviewees goes well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
4 
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Defendants have not been able to conduct discovery or cross-examine the individuals 
Coolc interviewed in order to test their evidence. Defendants .should be given the opportunity to 
•draw out anything which would tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the lay witness 
opinions. It would be blatantly prejudicial to simply permit Coot to pass "this untested -and 
TinchaUengeidMoxmationontothejuty; ' . 
• POINT 3 
THE IAY OPINIONS UP^^ , 
• There are. serious problems with the relevance .of Cook's interview .data'.- As/an example,' 
Cook apparently .interviewed an.assistant store manager of .the Smiths store and representatiyes 
of "a Burger King- on the east side .of-U.S. 89, across -from the •subject Arby-'s location, * These' 
locations are-more .distant from the-elevafced US. • 89 .than the Arby's property. The Smith's;store . 
is further north, than the Arby's property and. does npt face the highest point of the elevated U.S. 
89, Additionally, Coolc fails to explain how the lack of customer complaints2 about loss of view 
at a grocery .store (or other unrelated locations) has any bearing on deteixoirring the loss in the 
fair market yalue of the subject property. The Cook. Appraisal is replete with this kind of 
irrelevant material. 
2
 Cook relies upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations other than 
subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage for loss of view. 
Even if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any relevance in this matter, 
Cook has laid no foundation to show that the persons interviewed would have been the persons 
to whom customers would have complained. 
5 
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POINT 4 
'THE MATERIAL COOKRELES UPONE NOT OF THE TYPE AN APPRAISER 
SEASONABLY BASES OPINIONS 
.
 t . • . Rule 703, UTAHR. BVID. states the data upon; which anerpert bases his opinion need not 
be admissible in-evidence if--the data is "of a type reasonably reEed iiponby experts/in the. 
particular field in forming opinions* „.?5 Cook fails to explain that opinions of lay witnesses, 
particularly those who have-no familiaritj'-'with the subject-property are-the type of facts or data 
.upon "which a licensed-real, estate -appraiser would' reasonably rely to. value property The-
material, which isnot admissible due to-the problems-discussed above, is iiot of the type upon . 
.which, an appraiser idlies to appraise real property.' Cook's opinions shotild.be/based-upon the 
.standard of Rule 702; UTAH-R. EvrD., rather,than memorialize impermissible lay .opinions'. " 
•Therefore, it should he rejected, and to. "the extent -Cook 'has reEed upon that information^ he • 
should he excluded from discussing it at trial' • 
• • • • - . • " •
 ;
 -.'POINTS- ; \ " " ; 
COOK'S UNDERLYING METHODOLOGY HAS NOT BEEN-DISCLOSED'. 
Not only does Cook fail to pro-vide any foundation concerning the qualifications-of the 
interviewees to render opinions, but he provides no information about the methodology of the 
interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified? How were the interviews 
conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to the subject property with iQspQot to 
the view issue? "What questions were asked? "What is the identity of persons interviewed who 
are not discussed in the Cook Appraisal? What individuals ?vere interviewed who are not 
6 
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mentioned in the report? "What infonnafion was obtained through the interview process -that 
contradicts -Code's opinions? What documentation or recordings exist of the interviews? 
Defendants have legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what is referenced in 
the Cook Appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of those who were 
interviewed. At a minimum, pursuant to Rub 705, UTAHE.. EVID., if for some reason the Court 
permits Cook to rely 'upon this data,-all of the facts and data underlying Cook's opinions should 
be disclosed to Arby's prior to trial. •' 
• •,-•' . - . • , ' : • ' . • '• ..POINTS • : • ' \ ' ' • .-
With the concerns referenced.above, 'Cook9 s opinion does not meet the standards required 
under Role'702.- That Rule,in relevaMpart^pfp-vides:^ • ' . ' . , 
(b) Scientific, technical or otherwise specialised knowledge may 
' '• .serve as the basis for .e^erttest^ 
other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a 
threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data,' and (pi) have been reliably applied to the 
facts of the case. • • -
(o) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is 
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is 
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of 
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by 
the relevant expert community 
As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UlAHR. E m is 
to be applied to "all .expert testimony!" The Note continues by explaining that, just as in federal 
court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper' responsibility to screen out unreliable 
7 
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expert testimony." To MfiU this role, the -Note advises that the trial judge should "confront 
proposed' expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should be "receptive to any plausible 
evidence that may bear on reliability.". , 
• - Because .Cook .relies upon irrelevant hearsay'opinions from lay witnesses,'Ms opinions 
are unreliable. Defendants • submit the -Court, acting as gatekeeper, should- exclude .such 
testimony-and^evidence at ."trial; • 
"• . • • • ' . ' ' •' • CONCLUSION- • .. ' • * ' ' • ' 
Based upon .the' foregoing, portions of.J. Phillip Cook's Appraisal-.should be stricken and he 
should -not be permitted-to express his opinions at trial based upon irrelevant hearsay and lay- • 
opinio iL • \A'•• 
. / y f i i . • - . • . . • • • , - • • • • 
. . DATED ABZ/M day of March, 2010 . . . 
"WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
r maid 1 -Winder 
[Fo3pW.Holt 
Vttomeys 'for Defendants 
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LGCG 
March 3, 2010 
Mr, Randy Hunter • 
Assistant Attorney General 
. State .of Utah . ' • • . 
1 SO East 300 South, 5"1 Floor ' • • ; . . . • . . . , 
Salt lake City, Utah 84114-0857' ' 
Re: Appraisal: A partial taidngbf the view out property right appurtenant to land owned 
by James Ivers, e t .at: (Arby's Restaurant), located' at ±.1253 -.North' Highway 89, 
' ' Farmington, -Davis County, Utah, -Parcel No. 269. of Project No: STP-0D67(1)O. ' • 
Dear Mr. Hunter: • • 
As you knew, on September 4, 2003,-we provided an "appraisal addressing mafkk value of/ 
the .taking <of -land 'and site/improvements from th'e. above-referenced .property. That . 
appraisal, which-addressed the value of ifej proper-taken, .severance 'damages and "benefits, 
'was "the basis for''negotiations that resulted in'settlihg'the -majority :of -issues' regarding the 
property owner's claim for-ca'mpensatidn/./Specific^li^ the'parties have reached-settlement 
"on the -value of-the property /actually taken .and claimed severance damages .relating 'p the 
taking of landscaping thkleftthe-propertyriori-confdrming relative to zoning. . " ' 
The Court has 'heard and ruied'bn the-owner's claim .that tost visibility/exposure and reduced 
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the properly. The Court ruled that 
property owners have no appurtenant- rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have 
appurtenant rights only to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access-in 
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the-owner's claim that 
lost--view-out reduced value of the property, its conclusion was that view, from a. property 
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's 
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto 
must be addressed • . 
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the 
reduced view to the east due to UDOT's elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It 
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has 
been paid. 
201 South Main, Suite 45,0, Salt lake Qly, UT B477T 
main a01-364>6233 fax 801.3S4.6230 wwwJecg.cam 
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Page Two 
As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of t h e data, reasoning, 
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process t o develop an opinion of value. The 
depth of-discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the ' 
' intended use stetad within this report. ~ 
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Sta.ndB.rds of Professional 
Appraisal Prs.c£\ce (USPAP) as .'promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation; 
The valuation date is December 30,2002; which is the date of Service of .Summons. 'After 
'•careful consideration, and analysis of available information, -we are of the ppiiHion that market •' 
• value of the subject is not negatively affected; by the reduced view o u t Therefore; no 
• compensation beyond that already paid-for the taking and claimed severance damages for 
lost landscaping is concluded,- •/ > 
this-conclusion is subject to'assumptions and "limiting conditions contained-in the report • 
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish -Its intended function. Please call if we can be^ of '• 
•further.assistance. •'••"•/'.'*. ."'.•'• ': \ • -•':" '• • ' ' • .::- -.'•".-' ' • .'.. 
•Respec^Tiliysubmiifed/-- : •."•'.. . ' V ; \ . / ' ' *' "' •'• '•••... ' •..*'.'••...'•. 
Richard C. Sloan .: .'.• . 
LEGG, LLC,.Appraiser 
Utah iSfcate.- Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 570Z759-CG0Q Expires' 11 -30-11" {• 
jJ.PhffipCook^MAI-CRE .• 
LECG, LLC, Director * .." ., 
Utah State - 'Certified General Appraiser '. 
Certificate 5451057-CG0G 'Expires 06-50-11 
2Q1 South Main, Suite 450; SattUke City- VT mm 
main 801364-6233 fez 801354.5230 www.lecg.com 
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LECG CERTJRCAT/ON 
CERTIFICATION. 
We certify that we have made-an investigation and analysis of the following property; 
Property Owned by James Ivers, et. al. 
{Arbyrs Restaurant) 
' located at .±1253 North-Highway 89 • 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah 
Davis County Assessors Parcel No, 08-051 -0097 
We certify that to the best of auricnowledge and belief: 
1. 
"2. 
.3.' 
5, 
6; 
7. 
9.. 
10. 
11/ 
12.. 
ia. 
14. 
15. 
16, 
The statements of fact contained in this-repork are true and correct 
The reported -analyses,-opinions, and conclusions are limited-only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our 
.peraonat/imparn^^ndunbiEised^ ' '• 
'We.have no presenter prdspecfaye "interest in the.property that Is the-subject of this report, and we have no. persona] interest with 
.respect to the paro'eslnvoiyed;' • ... \ .. ' . • -4 ' • • • • / • . • . / • 
W&'have no.pnssent or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report'and no personal interest with respect to.' 
the parses involved-
 < ', .• • .' 
" We have no'biaswlthTespectto-the property that is'the subject of .this reporter to the parties involved .with this assignment 
•Our engagementIn'tHis assignment'was not conBngsntupon developing^ reporting predetermined results." 
Our cprnpensarionior completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of..a predetermined value- or 
direction In value 'that-favors the cause of the.client, the amount of.the value qpinionr the attainment of .a stipulated result, or the 
occurrence ofe'subsecjuent event directly related to the intended use qf.this appraisal, . 
. The reported''analyses, 'opinion's, and .candusiqns -were -deveiapad, .and 'this report/has been prepared :in cpnformlty with the 
requirements of'the Code of- Professional .-£mics.& Standards-of Professional appraisal-'Practice of the Appraisal institute, .which '' 
.include ibk'timbrm Standards- of Professional Appraisal Practice * • ' . • •" ' • 
'Weihave made an inspection of 'the property;that'is'the -subject of .this-report . * 
NDX3ne^provldedprafessiona|'.assistance in preparing this report' ." ' . . 
J. Philip'Cook has-completed the requirements ofthe continuing-education program of the Appraisal Institute,-
The value .'conclusion as well as other opinions- expressed herein are -not based on a requested minrmum valuation, a specific 
valuation, or the/approval of a'bank • 
Qursfcate appraisal cerfificaBans have notbeen revoked, suspended,, canceled, or restricted. 
The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and-experience to complete the assignments a 
competent manner. 'The reader is referred to the appraisers' 'Statement of Qualifications, ' : • -
J. Philip Cook is currently a'Certlfied General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451 Q57-CG0Q; 
Richard C, Sloan is currency a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #57D7759-CG0D ' ' 
Dated: March 3 , 2 0 1 0 
|j. Philip Cook, MAI CR.E 
LECG, LLC, Director 
Utah State- Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 54S1057-CGOO Expires 06-30-71 
um^nA^ t J^e^u. 
! Richard C. Sloan 
LECG, LLC, Appraiser 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 57Q7759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11 
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LECG SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
Market Participant Interviews •. . 
We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug -and the owner of 
Burger King/ which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the subject 
Similar to'the subject; both Smith's and Burger King have restricted views west due to-the 
Highway 89 overpass, although both are more distant from the overpass than the subject 
.Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the. lack of view out of the store-
was not:an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view. • -
' He said that business had increased 20- percent'over the past year -and .25 percent .or more '• 
over the past two years.' / • ' . ' • ' • . • . - ' : " • : ' ' • ' ' " • ' • . •, 
Joshua Harrison of Blue Mountain Restaurants, who owns the Burger King store:said'that he •" 
and his parbier/Iorn Long, purchased the store In.-2004, -after the construction-of the,-, 
overpass; He said that the view of the. overpass from -the Testaurantbad no -bearing on- the' -. 
purchase-of the .-property .including the purchase price;-"nor'did "the newly ^constructed " 
overpass have any impact in general, ' '. ./• , • •• ;• . ' • 
.Adam Hawkes ' with NAi Utah in layton, who -is assisting in .redevelopment-of the . 
nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west pf the subject, said that no one cares • 
what they are looking at once they get insrde the -building. Likewise, Nick Mason with OB V 
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what property users want is .exposure. 
Mason.* is currently listing a-pad.-siteior.sale..located .qear-the-GBQ-North/W 5 .interchange.in.. . . 
Clearfield The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp with M5 raised up just to the east to 
cross over 680 North. Mason said that irregular shape of the parcel affected the asking price, 
but no consideration' was given for the obstructed view out to the east by th e freeway, 
We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of 
Carl's Jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's jr., Taco Bell and Arby's m CenfervflJe, 
and 1CFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street All of'these fest-food restaurants abut a 
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freeway overpass ar raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the 
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a 
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business. 
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the 
restaurant feces east with the raised freeway located across the street to the east The 
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as ft was across the 
street She also said that customers-could seeihe mountains to the east over the overpass. 
The regional manager fovArbf at this store, Matthew .Martin, said that traffic and exposure-
were the important Issues. Martin said that *once'the customers were Inside the store it 
didn't really matter what the view was. • . ' .. 
The layout .of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was.-constructed around'1993, is 
similar-to the iayout of the subject; joe -Rich, the property's developer with 'Woodbury • 
•Corporation, said he does,not remember view out-being discussed in any way. He said that 
The .property owner -of the Clearfield -Arty's,. Tneesa Kurtzebom, said that the raised-freeway 
was hota factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both*' 
.a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure'and. proximity to an • off-ramp-
as positives. She did not mention what the negatives-were but said that the raised freeway 
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurfzeborn said that in purchasing the 
property..she Jo.olced more. atwJfiat the .surroun.dingiievejqp.menJ: was..ap,dJheJypR.of.draw. ,. 
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart 
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a 
major draw to the center. 
Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north, 
purchased the subject in October 2009. According to Mr^Burt, his store has not been 
affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once 
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customers figured out how to -use the interchange upon completion of construction, his 
business -quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically 
• not view out. Mr. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's restaurant with the intent of 
expanding his store .upon termination .of the lease in.2017. • 
We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fest-fopd chains concerning site • 
' selection criteria and view out fcuss Smith, the site selection' manager for Wendy's, said that' 
view is a plus, but the view must be really bad before it-becomes a negative,, such as looking 
at a -garbage dump. 'With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view .is 
neutral' Smith said that the primary concerns are access -and exposure, with demographics, 
also playing a role, and he would have no .problem -siting a.'restaurant near an overpass as it . 
.may mean "better exposure. . "He-noted that the view'out from the Wen cfy's,, restaurant in • 
. Centerville isof a.gas-station tothe.north.and otherremiidevelopmentto/the west-and-e^ ':'..' 
•• Smith also .said that view-out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons' 
• •kesitningfora'nhour.or'mora . •• ... ' • .:.••'. . •:"''. 
iisa'Sbaw, the-western region site selection manager, with Carl's Jr.,5aid tha t view out is no£ 
an issue as iorig as- it is not bad,- such as an aduit entertainment establishment Shaw said .. 
that the main criteria considered in site selection .relates .to lot size, demographics, price,. 
• access, and visibility. She said that she tries to .site the restaurants by other retailers- or 
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she 
. can.,get.p.B0.p!]e in. tbe door, $ really doesn't matter what fteyj/iewMlifeJn.the store., irrthe., 
case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most Shaw 
referenced a store in New Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it 
Although access was unchanged; it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road 
hurt the business, 
We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection manager for 
Arby's restaurants, and were provided with the Arby's site selection criteria (previously. 
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presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was 
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass 
of surrounding development, and-tries to negotiate reciprocal parking. 
With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albert very minor. -He said there are 
many locations .that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the 
view. According to Langran, customers are notrnteresfcedan what they are looking at outthe 
window. He said whiiea view of the mountains may be -nice, it is not-critical. 
in addition, Langran said that loss of exposure .affects the impulse buyer which HS roughly 20 ' 
• percent of the business; ..He-said that office--.or residential customers fiat-are either return or. 
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located 
and'kn ow the 'backway into the. property,. ;• •. •• \ , -" ; ' • • •'•" •" .. . 
.•For •additional .support, photographs of various .-properties" with .obstructed • views .in- one or • 
two -directions, some of which were previously discussed, are presented *rn the /addenda. 
The .majority of th£se properHes;were :buiit:with the view obstruction already in place,.and 
there -is no evidence-any of the properties' values wens affected by the impaired view out 
Conclusion 
The paired' data analysis*is quite"conclusive'that'retail properly',values"are,''nof imp~ac±ed 
negatively by the loss of view out this is also the overriding consensus among teal estate 
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food 
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's 
value. 
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Randy Hunter . • • . - . . . . 
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under the bridge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. .Okay, let's look at slide.30, showing the distances. 
You've indicated" that"- the distances, on the averag-e, are a 
little bit shy
 ;of 200 feet? • ." ' 
A. Yeah, 192 is what we measure- from the store/- itself, 
to. the wall. It's about''65 feet from the property 'line to the 
wall. ' " • '. • • 
Q. • Okay'. Is it reasonable to review -- to re;fer to this 
as a. ^ partial view impairment"?. ••....• ' . 
A- • ".Certainly it/s only.; a partial- vi:ew impaix-rnent.' 
•There's .'no -- ''.',, .' -.' • ... • .' . ' 
Q.' ; There' s .not a total-, view impairment? •" 
A. ' —'.there'; s no'material view, impairment in. most • ' 
directions, but to the east there is .a partial view impairment. 
Q. Is view ah important. amenity for real estate? • 
A. . It.can be. • 
Q. What type of real estate is view important to? 
A. Resort hotels overlooking the ocean, a.view would be 
very important- High end homes in resort settingsr a view is 
an amenity for which buyers will pay a premium. 
Q. How about industrial properties? 
A. Industrial properties are not bought for view out.. 
Most industrial buildings don't have windows. They're — 
they may have a few windows in the office area, but industrial 
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buildings are typically designed for either storage where 
they're stacking inventory along the outside walls, as well 
as throughout the center of the building, and so they don't 
have windows/ or it's manufacturing, where they don't want 
employees to be looking out the window while they're — while 
they're working, for safety purposes. 
Q. How about the view in, visibility; is that important 
to an industrial property? 
A. It can- be. 
Q. Why is that? 
•A. Well, some industrial businesses are — they'll have 
a what we call -a * showroom warehouse." So like a lot of home 
construction materials companies like tile companies will 
like to advertise and get people into their showroom. They 
are actually selling wholesale to the contractors, but the 
homeowner's picking out the goods. So if they can be exposed 
to, say, a freeway or something, and have that visibility, that 
can help their business. 
Q. Is it customary for them to put -some — their name or 
some advertising on the outside of the building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does that contribute — that visibility contribute to 
an industrial property? 
A. An industrial user that is worried about — or is 
hopeful to get some recognition from'the marketplace, that's 
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exactly what they want to do. 
Q. It provides some name recognition? . 
A.. Right, but there are a lot of industrial users that 
don't care. This is sort of a unique little group of industrial 
users where there's some advantage-t.o that disability. 
'•'Q. So .the'visibility in is. different than the visibility 
out.; is that what you're saying? . • .. 
A. Significantly.- . • ' . 
•Q. 03cay, how about fast food restaurants.;' is. view' out an 
important amenity'.to a fast food restaurant? •' 
'• A.. ' It' is-'not. " It wasn't listed, in the .criteria of site 
' seie'-ction •f.ox fast food.-.operators. -It. •wasn't, s offle thing ' that in-
my varied -discussions, with individuals .who' axe. inwolve.d in that.-
business .identified as-an is.sue.' 'I've also studied it -with 
specific paired sales suggested is not an amenity ••that fast 
food restaurants care about. • •'' 
Q. Where are fast' food restaurants typically .-located? 
' A. They are typically located along freeway interchanges 
or in front of shopping centers. Ideally, both. 
Q. Is that for their convenience? 
A. Right, it's for convenience, it's.for visibility, it's 
for accessibility. 
Q. I believe you said fast food restaurants are frequently 
located at highway/freevfay intersections. 
A. They are. 
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to an 
but 
their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base 
their opinion. We have a standards obligation, an ethical 
obligation to provide appraisal work in a non --
Q. Want to pull the microphone back towards --
A. — in a non-misleading way, and to prove our — prove 
our opinions*' Wot just to pull something out -of the air, but 
to actually prove our opinions. Even though there's a lot of 
anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not 
something these fast food operators particularly care about, 
we need to go to the market to confirm that. 
Q. So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in 
forming j'our opinions? 
A. "Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my 
sole reliance. 
Q. Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case 
studies? 
A. That I cannot is — I cannot find in the marketplace 
where this changed the subject's situation, specifically 
related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding 
accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which 
I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court, 
that just th'is view impairment has no impact on market value. 
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Q. That's the conclusion of your data? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is -that supported by your other research"? 
A. It is. 
Q. -Does it surprise you .that yo,u couldn'-t- ."find any -value '* 
for' that view -out? . •. • • " . . ' • ' " • '• . 
A. It doesn't.' •••''..•• ' 
.'Q. .Why is that? ...•'•
 > •'•'•. ' 
A. " Because of how common it .is in this imperfect world '. 
'that —'that view impairment, especially ,in situations next to*' 
the highway, where you're ' trying, to., attract "high-way business, 
how.common.that is, and'why. a business'would .locate"" in* that-' 
situation if i't were — : if .it were .that critical of a '.factor ', .  •..-
So. r'm. not'surprised bj the results; , •
 V i •• • '. -.•.••;•'.'••••• 
•Q-. -Now, I've asked you to look, at a boob-by Misters •' 
Bell- and Oral Anderson, published' by the American — or. the 
Appraisal- Institute, ' titled '""-Real .Estate Damages.". Have you 
looked at that book? • . 
A. Yes, 
• Q. You're familiar with that book? 
A. I am 
Q. In fact, I had the. first edition, and you gave me the 
second edition; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A newer mod — newer version *of it. Is this approach 
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A. I did. 
Q« You obtained anecdotal evidence — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — from market participants; and based upon that 
effort,- that research, what was your conclusion? 
A. I couldn't isolate or prove or identify any valu-e, loss 
or value diminution related to this partial view impairment out 
to the east, or this fast food restaurant property. 
MR. HUNTER: Thank you. Your Honor, might I approach 
for a moment? 
THE COURT: Please . 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
Q. BY MR. HUNTER: So j u s t to conclude, i t i s your 
p ro fe s s iona l opinion tha t the view out from the Arby f s 
r e s t a u r a n t has no monetary value? 
A, Correc t . 
Q. Thank you. If you can stay, because we're going to 
need to review some of these, i£ that's okay? 
A. I guess so. 
Q. I don't know how you got that set up. All right, 
thank you. Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WINDER: 
Q. Good morning, Mr. Cook. 
A. Good morning, Mr.' Winder. 
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A. Yes, that's my testimony. 
Q. Ail right, and — and it's 20 to 22 feet high? 
A. yes. '. • • . . . '• 
• .Q. HOW wide is- this? . ' . • • . • • 
A. I don't know. . - . ' • ' 
,'•' Q. It's quite a .distance. ' It's g.ot how many • la-iies .of-
•traffic in each'direction.? . . • ' . - ' 
. ,- A- i b'elieve'i-t has' two- lanes of traffic 'in each 
direction. .' • • •• •"' • '.. . .'..-.• 
Q:-. All rights and how loag is., this' obstruction, from 
(.where to. .where? , "How 'long-does it run?--- • -. ' 
• A. 'How l.ong-'is tire road,'or how/long is.-the — .'.''•'.' 
•Q.. -'.Elevated-.' , How long lis the. road as -elevated'here?' 
.A.' Probably three-quarters a-mile to the north and a half 
mile to the south. Ho, actually it probably continues elevated 
even beyond a half m'ile .to the south. 
Q. Okay, now we — >we agree that view is a component of 
value for at least some properties? 
A. ITes. / 
Q. All right, and an example would be a res — a single 
family residence in a mountain resort? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It could also be an office building where someone may 
want to- look at the Wasatch- and pay a little more rent., as 
opposed to looking at a building right next door; could be in 
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that kind of situation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, it could be.as individuals. If we wanted 
to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay 
more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the — or the bay 
than something else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. So a buyer, renter or tenant in these 
situations may pay more for a view? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Our disagreement, Mr.. Cook, in this case, is with the 
ultimate issue. That is, does the- impairment of view that's 
been lost by the Arby's operation, did they suffer any damage 
because of it. That's our difference. 
A. Yes, that's why we're here. 
Q. That's why we're here, okay. Now, let's talk about 
some of these — and I'm sorry, I — a copy of the slides that 
I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than 
yours. Xn purple and at my age, there's — I'm sorry, there's 
no way I can read-that, but if — 
A. If you tell me what- it is, then I'll — 
Q. Thank you very much. 1 appreciate that. So let's — 
let's review some of these slides, and talk about them. I'm on 
page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel. My copies are 
teeny, tiny. We had it there, yeah. Good. I can't read the 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ,
 !TA „ A „ FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
- 0 0 O 0 0 -
 A p R 2 _ 
Utah Department of 
Transportation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Case No. 20100511-SC 
James I vers; Katherine G. 
Havas; and P and P Pood 
Services, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon Appellee's motion, filed on 
March 28,2012, for an enlargement of time to file their response to 
Appellants' Motion for Summary Disposition filed in the above-entitled 
matter. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the motion is granted. The Appellees 
response to the Motion for Summary Disposition is due to be filed with 
the Utah Supreme Court on or before April 18, 2012. 
For The Court: 
T)dtte\Q^uZ <2~f <^&/"£- PatH. Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
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Judicial Assistant 
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SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES IVERS 
(ARBY'S RESTAURANT) 
Parcel Number 269 
Project No. STP-0067(1)0 
Located at 
±1253 North Highway 89 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah 
PREPARED FOR: 
STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
c/o Mr. Randy Hunter 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Submitted by: 
J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE 
Director, and 
Richard Sloan, Appraiser 
LECG, LLC 
201 South Main Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILE NUMBER: 10-03-01SL 
CASE NUMBER: jiver-25561 
EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL DATE: 
December 30, 2002 
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LCCG 
March 3,2010 
Mr. Randy Hunter 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor • . • • • . • 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-085 7 
Re: Appraisal: A partial taking of the view out property right appurtenant to land owned 
by James Ivers, et a!. (Arby's Restaurant), located at ±1253 North Highway 89, 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah. Parcel No. 269 of Project No. STP-0067(1)0. 
Dear Mr. Hunter: 
As you know, on September 4, 2003, we provided an appraisal addressing market value of 
the taking of land and site improvements from the above-referenced property. That 
appraisal, which addressed the value of the property taken, severance damages and benefits, 
was the basis for negotiations that resulted in settling the majority of issues regarding the 
property owner's claim for compensation. Specifically, the parties have reached settlement 
on the value of the property actually taken and claimed severance damages relating to the 
taking of landscaping that left the property non-conforming relative to zoning. 
The Court has heard and ruled on the owner's claim that lost visibility/exposure and reduced 
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the property. The Court ruled that 
properly owners have no appurtenant rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have 
appurtenant rights only to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access in 
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the owner's claim that 
lost-view out reduced value of the property. Its conclusion was that view, from a.property 
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's 
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto 
must be addressed. 
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the 
reduced view to the east due to UDOT's elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It 
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has 
been paid. 
201 South Wain, Suite 45.0, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
main 801364.6233 fax 801364.6230 www.lecg.com 
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Page Two 
As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of the data, reasoning, 
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process to develop an opinion of value. The 
depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the 
intended use stated within this report. 
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice (USPAP) as promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation. 
The valuation date is December 30, 2002, which is the date of Service of Summons. After 
careful consideration and analysis of available information, we are of the opinion that market 
value of the subject is not negatively affected by the reduced view out Therefore, no 
compensation beyond that already paid for the taking and claimed severance damages for 
lost landscaping is concluded. 
This conclusion is subject to assumptions and limiting conditions contained in the report. 
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish its intended function. Please call if we can be. of 
further assistance. . 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard C. Sloan 
LECG, LLC, Appraiser 
Utah State.- Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5707759-CGOO Expires 11 -30-11 
jj. Philip Cook, MA! CRE 
LECG, LLC, Director 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11 
201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
main 801.364.6233 fax 801.364.6230 www.lecg.com 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LECG CERTIFICATION 
CERTIFICATION 
We certify that we have made an investigation and analysis of the following property: 
Property Owned by James Ivers, et. ai. 
(Arby's Restaurant) 
Located at ±1253 North Highway 89 
Farmington, Davis County, Utah 
Davis County Assessor's Parcel No. 08-051 -0097 
We certify that to the best of our knowledge and belief: 
1. The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct 
2. The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our 
personal, impartial, and unbiased professional analyses, opinions, and conclusions. 
3. We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report, and we have no persona! interest with 
respect to the parties involved. 
. 4. We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report and no personal interest with respect to 
the parties involved. 
5. We have no bias with respect to the property that is the subject of this report or to the parties involved with this assignment 
6. Our engagement in this assignment was not contingent upon developing.or reporting predetermined results. 
7. Our compensation for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of a predetermined value or 
direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the amount of the value opinion, the attainment of a stipulated result, or the 
occurrence of a subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this appraisal. 
8. The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions were developed, and this report has been prepared in conformity with the 
requirements of the Code of Professional Ethics & Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice of the Appraisal institute/ which 
include the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 
9. We:have made an inspection of the property that is the subject of this report 
10. No one provided professional assistance in preparing this report 
11. J. Philip Cook has completed the requirements of the continuing education program of the Appraisal Institute. 
12. The value conclusion as well as other opinions-expressed herein are not based on a requested minimum valuation, a specific 
valuation, or the approval of a loan. 
13. Our slate appraisal certifications have not been revoked, suspended, canceled, or restricted. 
14. The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and experience to complete the assignment in a 
competent manner. The reader is referred to the appraisers1 Statement of Qualifications. 
15. J. Philip Cook is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451057-CG00. 
16. Richard C Sloan is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5707759-CGOO 
Dated: March 3, 2010 
IWwwX SL ^mu^ 
|J. Philip Cook, MAI CRE 
LECG, LLC, Director 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11 
Richard C. Sloan 
LECG, LLC, Appraiser 
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser 
Certificate 5707759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11 
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Market Participant Interviews 
We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug and the owner of 
Burger King, which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the subject 
Similar to the sub)edt both Smith's and Burger King have restricted views west due to the 
Highway 89 overpass, although both are more distant from the overpass than the subject. 
Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the lack of view out of the store 
was not an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view. 
He said that business had increased 20 percent over the past year and 25 percent or more 
over the past two years. 
Joshua Harrison of Blue Mountain Restaurants, who owns the Burger King store said that he 
and his partner, Tom Long, purchased the store in 2004, after the construction of the 
overpass. He said that the view of the overpass from the restaurant had no bearing on the 
purchase of the property including the purchase price, nor did the newly .constructed 
overpass have any impact in general. 
Adam Hawkes with NAI Utah in Layton, who is assisting in redevelopment of the 
nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west of the subject, said that no one cares 
what they are looking at once they get inside the building. Likewise, Nick Mason with CB 
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what properly users want is exposure. 
Mason, is currently listing a..pad.site.for.saIe..locatednear.the-680...North/ir15 .interchange, .in.. 
Clearfield. The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp with 1-15 raised up just to the east to 
cross over 680 North. Mason said that irregular shape of the parcel affected the asking price, 
but no consideration was given for the obstructed view out to the east by the freeway. 
We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of 
Carl's jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's Jr., Taco Bell and Arby's in Center/Hie, 
and KFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street. All ofthese fast-food restaurants abut a 
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LECG SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
freeway overpass or raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the 
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a 
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business. 
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the 
restaurant faces east with the raised freeway located across the street to the east. The 
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as it was across the 
street She also said that customers could see the mountains to the east over the overpass. 
The regional manager for Arby' at this store, Matthew Martin, said that traffic and exposure 
were the important issues. Martin said that once the customers were inside the store it 
didn't really matter what the view was. 
The layout of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was constructed around 1993, is 
similar to the layout of the subject Joe Rich, the property's developer with Woodbury 
Corporation, said he does not remember view out being discussed in any way. He said that 
Woodbury would not have reduced the price because of the obstructed view. 
The property owner of the Clearfield Arby's, Treesa Kurtzeborn, said that the raised freeway 
was not a factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both 
a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure and proximity to an off-ramp 
as positives. She did not mention what the negatives were but said that the raised freeway 
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurtzeborn said that in purchasing the 
p.r.operty~she..looked mote. at.what the. surrounding ..development was..and_thejyp_e..of.draw. 
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart 
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a 
major draw to the center. 
Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north, 
I purchased the subject in October 2009. According to Mr. Burt, his store has not been 
' affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once 
I -
1
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LECG SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT 
customers figured out how to use the interchange upon completion of construction, his 
business quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically 
not view out Mr. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's restaurant with the intent of 
expanding his store upon termination of the lease in 2017. 
We also interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site 
selection criteria and view out Russ Smith, the site selection manager for Wendy's, said that 
view is a plus, but the view must be really bad before it becomes a negative, such as looking 
at a garbage dump. With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view is 
neutral. Smith said that the primary concerns are access and exposure, with demographics 
also playing a role, and he would have no problem siting a restaurant near an overpass as it 
may mean better exposure. He noted that the view out from the Wendy's restaurant in 
Centerville is of a gas station to the north and other retail development to the west and east 
Smith also said that view out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons 
are sitting for an hour or more. 
Lisa Shaw, the western region site selection manager with Carl's jr., said that view out is not 
an issue as long as it is not bad, such as an adult entertainment establishment Shaw said 
that the main criteria considered in site selection relates to lot size, demographics, price, 
access, and visibility. She said that she tries to site the restaurants by other retailers or 
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she 
can ..get. people in. the door, jt .really .doesn't matter what they.yiewwM?.Jn. the store., Injhe.. 
case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most. Shaw 
referenced a store in New Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it 
Although access was unchanged, it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road 
hurt the business. 
We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection manager for 
Arby's restaurants, and were provided with the Arby's site selection criteria (previously 
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presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was 
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass 
of surrounding development, and tries to negotiate reciprocal parking. 
With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albeit very minor. He said there are 
many locations that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the 
view. According to Langran, customers are not interested in what they are looking at out the 
window. He said while a view of the mountaiins may be nice, it is not critical. 
In addition/ Langran said that loss of exposure affects the impulse buyer which is roughly 20 
percent of the business. He said that office or residential customers that are either return or 
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located 
and know the back way into the property. 
For additional support, photographs of various properties with obstructed views in one or 
two directions, some of which were previously discussed, are presented in the addenda. 
The majority of these properties were built with the view obstruction already in place, and 
there is no evidence any of the properties' values were affected by the impaired view out. 
Conclusion 
The paired data analysis is quife"* conclusive that retail property* values "are"* not imp'acted "" 
negatively by the loss of view out. This is also the overriding consensus among real estate 
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food 
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's 
value. 
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